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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is federal health care reform
legislation that represents the most significant health insurance expansion since
Medicare and Medicaid were created in 1965. In this dissertation, I focus on how
health insurance expansion affects the supply side of health care markets as well
as health expenditures. While health insurance expansion potentially increases the
demand for care, it also creates uncertainty, thereby impacting health care utilization,
delivery, and input decisions. In my first chapter, I examine whether changes in
health insurance coverage rates impact state-level health care delivery efficiency.
Health care providers may vary in the accuracy of their demand forecasts, which
could lead to inefficient excess capacity. My analysis reveals an average state-level
efficiency score of 61 percent, suggesting significant underutilized inputs. I also find
that states with higher insurance coverage rates tend to be less efficient. In my second
chapter, I develop a theoretical framework that explains how a health insurance
mandate impacts hospital input levels. To empirically investigate the channels of
the framework, I use a ten-year panel of data to compare Massachusetts hospitals
with those in other surrounding states. The results suggest that the Massachusetts
health insurance mandate significantly reduced the demand for emergency care but
left overall demand unchanged. It also significantly increased capacity. The increase
in capacity without a corresponding increase in overall demand suggests inefficiency.
In my third chapter, I explore the relationship between state-level health insurance
coverage rates and Medicaid expenditures. My empirical results suggest that state
vi
Medicaid expenditures are more responsive to private health care expenditures and
population aging rather than health insurance coverage rates.
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A hallmark of the recently passed U.S. health care reform legislation is the requirement
that individuals purchase health insurance coverage or face a penalty beginning in
2014. This individual mandate potentially represents the most significant health
insurance expansion since the Medicare and Medicaid programs were created in 1965.
However, legitimate concerns regarding a large scale health insurance expansion focus
on the possible ramifications of rising health care costs. In order to better understand
the potential impacts of a large scale health insurance expansion, economic evaluation
is a critical component of debate.
Significant attention within the literature is given to the effect of changes in health
insurance coverage on consumer utilization of care and medical expenditures. Since
health insurance coverage improves a consumer’s access to care through a reduction
in out of pocket costs, early research suggests that health insurance expansion is
one of the main drivers of increases in health care expenditures (Feldstein (1973b)).
However, empirical evidence from the the Rand Health Insurance Experiment
(RHIE) concludes that the impact is much smaller than estimates in earlier work
suggest (Newhouse (1993)). Despite the focus on consumer utilization and health
expenditures, it remains uncertain how a large scale health insurance expansion affects
the supply side of the market. My dissertation will fill a gap within the literature by
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considering how changes in health insurance coverage potentially affect U.S. states
and hospital behavior. Specifically, I will focus on how changes in health insurance
impact state-level health care delivery, hospital input decisions, and the funding of
Medicaid expenditures.
A health insurance mandate may affect a health system’s inputs through changes
in the level of health insurance coverage and demand for care. A health insurance
mandate likely increases health insurance coverage, which improves access to care.
A large number of newly insured consumers potentially increases overall demand for
medical services. However, insurance expansion that improves access to care also
may decrease the demand for emergency services. Uncertainty in the magnitude of
the changes in the demand for care make it difficult for a health system to predict
how a health insurance mandate will affect the amount of inputs needed in order
to meet demand. This uncertainty impacts health systems, because managers must
decide ex ante whether or not to add inputs. Therefore, if a health insurance mandate
affects the demand for care in ways that health care systems find hard to predict,
then they could potentially choose an excessive amount of capacity that could add
substantially to health care costs. This first two essays of this dissertation focus
explicitly on isolating the potential impacts of insurance expansion that are working
through these channels.
In my first co-authored essay (with Bruno Wichmann), we examine whether
changes in health insurance coverage rates impact state-level health care system
efficiency. Our analysis reveals an average state-level efficiency score of 61 percent
suggesting significant underutilized inputs. We then explore the variation in efficiency
of health care delivery to determine if health insurance coverage substantially impacts
efficiency. Results show that a one percentage point increase in health insurance
coverage decreases efficiency of health care delivery by approximately 1.3 percentage
points. This implies that as health insurance expands, states add inputs into the
health production process that do not necessarily improve health outcomes, thereby
2
reducing the efficiency of health care delivery. This results suggests that health care
costs may actually rise from inefficiencies stemming from health insurance expansion.
In my second essay, I consider how a health insurance expansion increases
inefficiency by specifically focusing on hospital inputs. Using a theoretical framework
of cost minimization, I explain how changes in health insurance coverage potentially
influence a hospital’s choice of input levels. Then, I empirically examine how a health
insurance expansion influences hospital input levels by studying Massachusetts and
neighboring states. In 2006, Massachusetts instituted health care reform legislation,
which also included an individual mandate for health insurance; therefore, exploiting
this change in state-level health care policy provides a unique opportunity for
empirical study. By comparing Massachusetts to other states, I can empirically
isolate the effects of the reform on hospital capacity and employment levels as well
as utilization measures of demand for care.
The results suggest that a health insurance mandate significantly increases
hospital capacity and reduces the utilization of emergency care. In addition, the
health insurance mandate does not significantly affect overall utilization measures of
hospital services and employment levels. Specifically, for an average hospital the effect
of the health insurance mandate increases overall capacity by approximately 7 beds.
The health insurance mandate also reduces the number of annual ambulance trips
to the average hospital by 16%. This equates to a daily reduction of one ambulance
trip for an average hospital affected by the reform relative to one that is not. These
results also have important implications for health care costs. While the mandate does
significantly increase hospital capacity, the magnitude of the effect suggests it is likely
that the additional beds fit within the existing structure of the hospital. Therefore,
the added capacity does not suggest a substantial increase in hospital expenditures
from investments expanding the physical structure of a hospital. Overall, the effect of
the mandate on inputs suggests minimal impacts on health care costs that are passed
onto the consumer.
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In my third essay, I explore the historic relationship between state-level health
insurance coverage rates and Medicaid expenditures. A number of states are
concerned that health care reform is an unfunded mandate, because a provision of the
ACA mandates that states expand Medicaid eligibility requirements. States harbor
fears that this provision of health care reform might increase their share of Medicaid
expenditures on health care to unsustainable levels, when the federal government is no
longer willing to provide assistance that makes the expansion possible. In this essay,
I specifically examine how the growth in public and private health insurance coverage
rates impacts the growth in the portion of Medicaid expenditure that the state
government is responsible for. My empirical results suggest that a state’s Medicaid
expenditures are more responsive to private health care expenditures and population
aging rather than health insurance coverage rates. These results suggest that with
respect to cost containment a state should be far more concerned with changing
demographics of their population rather than insurance expansion mandated by the
ACA.
The following chapters of this dissertation outline the methods, results, and
conclusions in more detail.
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Chapter 2
Efficiency of Health Care Delivery:
Effects of Health Insurance
Coverage
2.1 Introduction
Health care expenditures in the United States have increased significantly in recent
years. The United States spent 5.9% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health
care in 1965, by 2008 that percentage grew to 16.2% of GDP totaling 2.3 trillion
dollars. The average annual growth rate of national health care expenditures over
the 10 year period from 1999-2008 is approximately 7%.1
Understanding this rapid rise in health care costs is a growing concern. Early
research examining the growth of health care expenditures (HCE) identified that GDP
is positively correlated to HCE and explains a high percentage of the variation in HCE
growth (see Newhouse (1977), Parkin et al. (1987), Gerdtham et al. (1992), Hitiris
and Posnett (1992)). Further research refines the econometric techniques surrounding




panel unit root analysis and cointegration of GDP and HCE (see McCoskey and Selden
(1998), Gerdtham and Lothgren (2000), Freeman (2003), Jewell et al. (2003), Carrion-
i Silvestre (2005), Wang and Rettenmaier (2007), and Moscone and Tosetti (2010) ).
Recent studies explore alternative determinants of HCE growth besides GDP, such
as: physician reimbursement and the mixture of public verses private funding (see
Gerdtham et al. (1992)), age and proximity to death (see Zweifel et al. (1999), Felder
et al. (2000), Seshamani and Gray (2004), Matteo (2005), Werblow et al. (2007)),
wage increases in excess of productivity growth (see Hartwig (2008)), and electoral
motives (see Potrafke (2010)).
In this research, we take a fresh look at potential determinants of HCE by
empirically investigating the impact of changes in health insurance coverage on the
efficiency of health care delivery systems. In this context, technical efficiency is defined
as the system’s ability to minimize health care input consumption given the delivery
of a certain health outcome (e.g. a target mortality rate).2 Inefficiencies in health
care systems imply under-utilization of health care inputs resulting in greater HCE.
Greater HCE arises as a consequence of avoidable maintenance and opportunity costs
of unused inputs. This issue is particularly salient given that the federal government
recently enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. This reform has the
potential to expand health insurance coverage to 46.3 million uninsured Americans.3
Corroborating this expectation, empirical evidence suggests that the individual health
insurance mandate in Massachusetts increases health insurance coverage (see Long
(2008), Long et al. (2009), Yelowitz and Cannon (2010), and Kolstad and Kowalski
(2010)).
According to Nyman (1999) an increase in health insurance coverage increases
the demand for health care by lowering individuals’ out of pocket cost for medical
services. Since health care reform potentially increases the size of health care markets,
it is important to evaluate possible changes in the efficiency of health care delivery
2Hereafter we refer to technical efficiency as efficiency.
3U.S. Census Bureau; Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States:
2008, Current Population Reports, page 20, Issued September 2009.
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systems. In order to choose capacity, health care systems form expectations about
the sensitivity of demand to changes in health insurance coverage. Due to uncertain
demand for care, the possibility remains that expanding health insurance coverage
reduces the efficiency of health care delivery systems. For example, in response to
a large expected influx of paying customers, systems might have incentives to add
unnecessary capacity and personnel.4
The health care literature has examined effects of health insurance coverage on
labor market outcomes (see Gruber and Madrian (1997), Royalty and Abraham
(2006), Boyle and Lahey (2010)), entrepreneurship (see Holtz-Eakin et al. (1996),
Fairlie et al. (2010), Heim and Lurie (2010)), precautionary saving (see Levin (1995),
Chou et al. (2003)), and personal finance (see Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008), Gross
and Notowidigdo (2011)). Another body of literature relates health insurance
and welfare (see Feldstein (1973a), Manning et al. (1987a), Feldman and Dowd
(1991),Chiu (1997), Palangkaraya et al. (2009)). Cutler and Gruber (1996) and
Gruber and Simon (2008) show that public insurance expansions crowd-out private
health insurance. However, despite this vast literature, empirical evidence regarding
the impact of health insurance coverage on efficiency is scarce and conflicting. Chang
et al. (2004) find a negative impact of health insurance coverage on hospital efficiency
when Taiwan implemented a national health insurance program. Brown III (2002)
finds a positive impact of managed care insurance on hospital efficiency.
As opposed to examining hospital efficiency, we investigate the relationship
between health insurance coverage and health care systems, providing new insights
into HCE variations. Modeling a health care system as a U.S. state, we estimate
efficiency accounting for the effects of environmental factors such as health insurance
coverage. Specifically, we apply the Simar and Wilson (2007) - SW hereafter -
two-stage semi-parametric model of production processes to estimate the efficiency
of health care delivery systems and the impact of increasing health insurance.
4Refer to Smet (2007) for a discussion on hospital efficiency, demand uncertainty, and standby
capacity.
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The estimation of the SW model involves bootstrap procedures that generate bias
corrected Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) efficiency scores.5 This approach
improves statistical efficiency of the regression of estimated efficiency on health
insurance coverage. The analysis utilizes annual data from 2000 to 2007. A
comparable rank order of estimated efficiency is provided.6
We estimate average efficiency to be 61% suggesting significant inefficiencies in the
American health care sector. These inefficiencies potentially explain a portion of rising
health care costs. Moreover, we estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in health
insurance coverage decreases the efficiency of health care delivery by 1.3 percentage
points. This result indicates that extraneous costs may rise as a consequence of the
recently enacted health care reform. Our estimates suggest that a 1 percentage point
increase in health insurance coverage potentially translates into 28.77 billion dollars
in additional inefficiency cost. Traditional regression analysis ignoring the DEA bias
overestimates the impact of increasing health insurance by approximately 19%.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses background
literature and presents the conceptual framework for a state’s health care delivery.
Section 3 describes the methods and characterizes the data. Section 4 presents
empirical results. Section 5 provides a discussion. Section 6 offers conclusions.
2.2 Health Care Delivery
Research assessing efficiency within the health care sector is vast because of its
ability to identify unnecessary input consumption and inform policy. Although
there is a significant body of literature considering hospital efficiency, empirical
5For a survey of the statistical properties of DEA estimators see Simar and Wilson (2000). Section
2.3 provides additional discussion of efficiency estimation and DEA bias.
6DEA input-efficiency scores are bounded between 0 and 1. A health system’s efficiency score of
0.80 represents 20% of unnecessary input consumption, i.e., this system can theoretically reduce its
input usage by 20% without reducing output. A score of 1 represents no input waste implying an
efficient system.
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work concerning the efficiency of health care delivery systems is limited.7 From the
hospital’s perspective the relevant efficiency question is about the ability to minimize
input usage to serve a target number of patients. However, from the health care
system’s perspective the relevant question is about the ability to minimize input
usage given the delivery of a target health outcome.
Research focusing on health care delivery systems includes Retzlaff-Roberts et
al. (2004), Bhat (2005), and Spinks and Hollingsworth (2009), all of which estimate
the efficiency of health care delivery for particular OECD countries using DEA. In
these studies, the authors include measures of education, employment, and income as
inputs into the health care delivery function. While these socio-economic variables
potentially affect health outcomes, pinpointing the channels these measures operate
through continues to generate discussion (see Duncan et al. (2002), Lahelma et al.
(2004), and Spinks and Hollingsworth (2009)). Retzlaff-Roberts et al. (2004) argue
that these types of variables fluctuate in the long run and influence health, but they
are beyond the short term discretionary control of policy makers.
In this study, we view a health care delivery system as a U.S. state. Therefore,
instead of focusing on health care delivery of countries, we estimate the efficiency
of states in delivering health care to their population. We take a different approach
from the literature in our treatment of socio-economic variables such as education,
employment, and income. We view these variables not as health care inputs, but as
environmental factors that may impact the systems’ ability to deliver a given health
outcome. This approach better fits with the perspective that these types of socio-
economic variables are beyond the immediate influence of policymakers. In assessing
the impact of these variables along with health insurance coverage, we utilize the SW
estimation approach that specifically accounts for non-discretionary inputs.
In our framework, the state chooses capital and labor to reach a target health
output. Health insurance expansion is expected to increase demand for care (see
7See Hollingsworth (2008) for an extensive review of the health care efficiency literature.
Pilyavsky and Staat (2008), Kristensen et al. (2010), and Blank and Valdmanis (2010) provide
recent research on hospital efficiency.
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Nyman (1999)). Therefore, states’ input decisions are based on expectations about
the sensitivity of the demand to variations in health insurance coverage. The
possibility remains that expanding health insurance coverage reduces states’ efficiency
of health care delivery. Given management heterogeneity and environmental factors,
some states will do a better job forecasting demand; however, some will add more
inputs than their peers (those with similar output level). These states are inefficient
and impose a cost that can be measured in terms of underemployed inputs.
The main inputs to the production of health are hospital capacity and health
care practitioners. We assume states utilize three health care inputs to deliver three
health care outputs. Specifically, inputs are hospital beds, general practitioners,
and registered nurses. Hospital beds represent a measure of physical infrastructure
(capital) and the latter two represent measures of the workforce (labor). The health
care outputs are survival rates, self reported health status, and population share
without disabilities.
In the empirical application of our conceptual framework, the state must have
mechanisms to manipulate input levels. Certificate of need (CON) policies enable
states to decide whether a hospital can add extra capacity. In terms of labor, medical
professionals can only legally practice medicine with a state license. States decide
licensing standards, which in turn impacts the number of health care practitioners in
the labor market. Therefore, states can influence the inputs to health care production
through regulation. Ferrier et al. (2010) examine the efficiency of U.S. hospitals
aggregated to the state level. Aggregation allows for the assessment of the impact
of CON laws on efficiency. They find the hospital sector in states with active CON
legislation performs better in terms of aggregate efficiency.
There are environmental factors that may influence health care delivery efficiency.
In this study, environmental factors include health insurance, poverty, education,
employment, income, and share of the population 65 and over. These socio-economic
variables fluctuate but are viewed as outside the immediate discretionary control of
state policy makers. In Appendix A, Figure ?? depicts our conceptual framework of
10
a health care delivery system. All future figures and tables are also provided in the
appropriate appendix.
While states can manipulate health care inputs through CON and licensing
standards, they are subject to federal legislation. The recent enactment of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act will significantly change the number of insured.
The main contribution of this research is to estimate the impact of health insurance
coverage on health care delivery efficiency. Our analysis provides new insights into
the consequences of health care reform.
2.3 Estimation and Data
The basic concepts of the economic theory underlying efficiency analysis are presented
by Koopmans (1951), Debreu (1951), and Farrell (1957). In our research, the health
care production frontier indicates the minimum inputs required by a state to deliver
a given health output. Thus, it reflects the current state of technology within the
health care industry. States in this industry operate either on or below the efficiency
frontier (or production frontier). The best practice states are the ones whose input
allocations place them on the efficiency frontier while inefficient states are the ones
that operate below the frontier. Distance functions can be used to measure possible
inefficiencies of the production process. The idea is to measure the distance between
a particular state’s production plan and the efficiency frontier. The measurement
involves the proportional contraction of the input vector, given an output target.
Distance function computation returns an efficiency score θi for each state i.
The health care delivery efficiency of state i is evaluated by θi. By construction
θi ≤ 1. θi = 1 indicates that state i is efficient, i.e. it consumes the minimum amount
of inputs necessary to produce the target output. If θi < 1, state i could reduce the
consumption of all inputs by (1− θi) ∗ 100 percent without reducing output. In this
case, state i utilizes more inputs than necessary and therefore is input-inefficient.
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Empirically, the challenge is to obtain an estimate of the production set, thus an
estimate of its closure: the efficiency frontier. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is
widely used to this end. The DEA approach consists of a nonparametric estimation of
an industry level production set. The idea behind DEA estimation is to construct the
smallest convex set containing all input and output data across production units.
Once the production set is estimated, one can use distance functions to obtain
measures of how far the production unit i is from the estimated frontier. This yields
i’s estimated efficiency score θ̂i .
In a typical two-stage efficiency analysis, DEA efficiency scores are computed
(first-stage) and then regressed on a set of environmental variables (second-stage).
Usually, tobit regressions are estimated to account for the fact that DEA efficiency
scores are bounded. However, this approach is problematic. As discussed by Simar
and Wilson (2007), the traditionally used DEA efficiency scores are biased estimators
of efficiency.8 In addition, these efficiency estimates are probably serially correlated in
a unknown way. For these reasons, maximum likelihood estimation and the standard
approaches to inference are not valid.
We model health care delivery efficiency according to the Simar and Wilson
(2007) two-stage semi-parametric model of production processes. The authors
provide guidance for efficiency estimation under the presence of environmental effects,
addressing the econometric issues described above. Our application of the SW
bootstrap procedure involves two stages. First, an initial bootstrap is used to
construct bias corrected DEA measures of efficiency. We estimate robust efficiency
scores for each state’s delivery of health care from 2000 to 2007. Second, estimated
efficiency is regressed on environmental variables. To be consistent with the SW
data generating process, we utilize truncated regressions in a second bootstrap to
8DEA uses the smallest convex set containing all data to approximate the true unknown
production set. However, the DEA set is by construction smaller or equal to the true production set,
and the true production frontier could be further away from the observation i than the estimated
DEA frontier is. Thus, the DEA efficiency score overestimates the true efficiency.
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estimate the effects of the environmental factors on efficiency.9 We follow SW to
construct 95% bootstrap confidence intervals. SW demonstrate through Monte Carlo
simulations that the use of their double bootstrap improves statistical efficiency in
the second-stage regression.10
Since the SW approach for analyzing the impact of environmental variables on
efficiency is relatively new, empirical work applying their bootstrapping methods in
the health care sector is limited. Pilyavsky et al. (2006) and Blank and Valdmanis
(2010) use the SW approach to analyze the efficiency of hospitals. Jarvio et al.
(2005) and Bernet et al. (2008) use this approach to study primary care facilities
and polyclinics, respectively. Afonso and Aubyn (2005) apply the SW bootstrapping
technique to estimate the efficiency of health care delivery for OECD countries. By
evaluating health care delivery efficiency of U.S. states, our research adds to this
growing body of empirical work using the SW approach. Comparing the estimates
from OLS, Tobit, and truncated regression with estimates from the SW bootstrapping
algorithm, our paper provides additional evidence for how traditional methods may
lead to incorrect estimation and inference.
Data
The empirical implementation of our efficiency analysis requires the collection of data
on health care inputs, outputs, and the relevant environmental factors from 2000-
2007. The number of hospital beds is obtained from the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) Hospital Cost Reports. The cost reports contain micro level
data for every facility that is certified by the CMS.11 To construct our capital input
measure we aggregate facilities’ beds within states. The number of family and general
9SW define efficiency as θi = ψ(zi,β) + εi where ψ is a continuous function, zi denotes
environmental variables, β is a vector of parameters, and ε represents a continuous iid random
variable truncated to make the input-efficiency 0 < θi ≤ 1. Refer to Simar and Wilson (2007) pages
34-37 for a detailed presentation of the data generating process.
10For a detailed exposure on the estimation approach and the construction of the confidence
intervals, refer to Simar and Wilson (2007), pages 42-43.
11Facilities participate in either the Medicare or Medicaid program.
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practitioners and the number of registered nurses are obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics database. In the family and general practitioners data 12 out of
the 384 observations are missing. In those instances, we use linear interpolation to
replace missing data. To accommodate size differences, the three inputs are divided
by the total state’s population (in millions), obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.
We use mortality rates, number of disabled, and self-reported health status
to construct the output measures. We transform mortality and disability into
positive health outcomes in order to estimate the efficiency of health care delivery.
Size differences are also accommodated in the output measures. We construct
survival share using mortality rate data available from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC). We construct able share using data from the Social
Security Administration (SSA).12 Finally, healthy share is the share of the total state
population that reported themselves as in “excellent”, “very good” or “good” health
on the CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Annual Survey.
The impact of health insurance coverage on efficiency is analyzed in two
specifications. The first considers total health insurance coverage (total coverage)
defined as the percentage of a state’s population with any type of health insurance.
The second specification considers private and public health insurance separately.
Private coverage accounts for employer provided and directly purchased health
insurance. Public coverage accounts for Medicare, Medicaid, and military health
insurance. We obtain the health insurance coverage data from the U.S. Census
Bureau.
In addition to health insurance coverage, five variables are specified in our second
stage regression. The variable poverty share is the share of the population with income
below a poverty threshold and is obtained from U.S. Census Bureau.13 The variable
employment share is the ratio of total employment to total population, obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The variable state gdp, the real per capita
12We formulate: survival share = 1− (# of deaths/population); able share = 1− disabled share.
13Average poverty threshold is $8.28 per person, per day.
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state gross domestic product (in hundreds of thousands of chained 2000 dollars), is
obtained from the BEA and used as a proxy for income. The variable diploma share,
the percentage of population with high school diploma or more, is obtained from the
U.S. Census Bureau and used as a proxy for education. Finally, the variable share 65+
represents the portion of the population 65 and over and is obtained from the U.S.
Census Bureau. Detailed data sources and summary statistics for inputs, outputs,
and the environmental variables are available Tables A.1-A.4 of the Appendix A.
Jarvio et al. (2005) and Pilyavsky et al. (2006) apply the approach of pooling the
data in the application of the SW algorithm. In this research, we treat each state in a
given year as a different decision making unit. We estimate a production frontier for
the whole period which is consistent with the SW model. An advantage of pooling
the data is that it increases the sample size, which is important due to the curse of
dimensionality that affects all nonparametric estimation.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 First Stage: Efficiency
Over the period analyzed, we estimate that 4 states have observations defining the
efficiency frontier (i.e., efficiency score equal to 1). These states are Colorado,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Utah. These are the best practice states and these
observations represent efficient health care delivery systems. Figure A.2 displays a
map of the United States with efficiency rankings in 2007. The map shows the location
and quantiles of the most efficient states. When considering average efficiency of the
complete period, the most efficient states are Utah (0.995), Arizona (0.896), Oregon
(0.894), Colorado (0.890), and California (0.849).14 Figure A.3 displays the right-
skewed estimated efficiency distribution for all analyzed years. Additional detailed
efficiency information for each state is available in Table A.5 of Appendix A.
14Average bias corrected DEA input-efficiency score in parentheses.
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Figure A.4 depicts the estimated average bias corrected DEA efficiency as well as
the average traditional DEA efficiency score. While average DEA efficiency is 75%
across states, the average bias corrected DEA efficiency is 61%. According to these
efficiency estimates, traditional DEA efficiency is biased in the upward direction by
approximately 14 percentage points. Therefore, it significantly underestimates the
cost of unnecessary health care input consumption. This is evidence that traditional
DEA measures can mislead policy.
There is a downward trend in average bias corrected DEA efficiency - estimated
efficiency hereafter. Estimated efficiency decreases 0.4 percentage points, on average,
every year. Although this decrease seems minuscule, the following back of the
envelope calculation demonstrates the cost of inefficiency associated with this trend.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. health care expenditures reached 2,241
billion dollars in 2007.15 Using this number as a proxy for health care input costs
and given average efficiency in 2007 is estimated to be 60%, the cost of inefficiency
in 2007 is approximately 896.4 billion dollars. Assuming annual expenditures
remain unchanged, a 0.4 percentage point increase in input-inefficiency represents
approximately an additional 90 billion dollars in wasted input expenditures in 2008.
2.4.2 Second Stage: Effects of Health Insurance Coverage
We estimate a truncated regression using the SW bootstrapping technique. We use
two specifications to capture a potential difference in the effects between private and
public health insurance coverage. The first includes our set of controls and total
health insurance coverage. The second substitutes separate measures of private and
public coverage for total coverage.
Results of these estimations are reported in Table A.6. We estimate a negative
impact of total health insurance coverage on the efficiency of health care delivery.
The coefficient on total coverage is estimated to be -1.284. Hence, we estimate that a
15U.S. health care expenditures obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Abstract, 2010.
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1 percentage point increase in the share of the state population with health insurance
decreases efficiency by approximately 1.3 percentage points. Based on the 95%
confidence interval, the marginal effect of total coverage on efficiency can be as high
as -1.8 and is no less than -0.8. Using U.S. health care expenditures in 2007 as a proxy
for input costs (2,241 billion dollars), a 1 percentage point increase in health insurance
coverage potentially translates into 28.77 billion dollars in additional inefficiency cost.
This amount increases to 34.33 billion dollars based upon typical two-stage efficiency
analysis (as described in section 3).16 In terms of policy implications, this overestimate
from traditional methods illustrates the importance of using SW procedures.
Using the second specification, we analyze the impacts of private and public health
insurance on efficiency. The 95% confidence interval on public coverage includes
zero; therefore statistically, public health insurance coverage does not influence the
efficiency of health care delivery. Corroborating this conclusion, notice that both the
point estimate of the coefficient on private coverage and its confidence interval are
close to that of total coverage in specification (1). We estimate that a 1 percentage
point increase in private health insurance coverage decreases health care delivery
efficiency by 1.113 percentage points.
For the analysis of the other covariates, we interpret the results of the second
specification because it has smaller variance. The coefficient on share 65+ is the
largest (in absolute value) among all coefficients estimated, suggesting that health
care delivery efficiency is more sensitive to changes in the share of the population 65
and over than it is to changes in any other environmental variable. We estimate that
a 1 percentage point increase in the share of the population 65 and over decreases
efficiency by 5.25 percentage points. Because a significant portion of the insured
population 65 and over has public health insurance, the inclusion of share 65+
captures most of the variation in public coverage, and is probably responsible for
the low point estimate on its coefficient in specification (2).17 According to the U.S.
16Traditional second stage regressions available in the appendix.
17In fact, an auxiliary regression excluding share 65+ delivers similar coefficients for private
coverage and public coverage.
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Census Bureau, people 65 and over represented 12.4% of the American population
in 2000. By 2030, it is projected that 19% of the population will fall into this age
category.18 This represents a 6.6 percentage point increase in share 65+. According
to our estimates, this change in the population age distribution will, ceteris paribus,
decrease health care delivery efficiency by approximately 34 percentage points. As
the portion of population 65 and over grows, the amount of inefficient expenditures
will dramatically increase. This is of particular concern given that the majority of
health care expenditures by this age group are primarily funded through public health
insurance, which is subsidized by state and federal governments.19
Poverty and education are important environmental factors impacting efficiency.
The coefficient on poverty share is negative, and the coefficient on diploma share is
positive. We estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of the population
in poverty decreases health care delivery efficiency by approximately 1.6 percentage
points. As for education, our result indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in
the share of the population with complete secondary education increases health care
delivery efficiency by approximately 1 percentage point. While poverty and education
seem to be relevant factors, employment and income do not present significant impacts
on efficiency. The coefficients on employment share and state gdp have relatively wide
95% confidence intervals. The wide confidence intervals including zero are statistical
evidence that health care delivery efficiency is independent of real per capita income
and employment level.
2.5 Discussion
Empirical evidence regarding the effects of health insurance coverage on efficiency is
scarce and conflicting. The existing research involves the efficiency of hospitals and
18U.S.Census Bureau, Population Division, Interim State Population Projections, 2005.
19It is important to note that efficiency scores are not indicators of the quality of health care.
These measures should not be viewed as influencing individuals’ migration decisions. States face
these demographic projections and must consider better ways to manage health care inputs if they
are to improve health care delivery efficiency.
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not the efficiency of health care systems. Chang et al. (2004) use an OLS regression
and find a negative impact of health insurance coverage on hospital efficiency when
Taiwan implemented a national health insurance program. Brown III (2002) uses a
stochastic frontier model to estimate efficiency and finds a positive impact of managed
care insurance on hospital efficiency.20
Our main contribution to the health care literature is to estimate the effect of
health insurance coverage on the efficiency of health care delivery systems. Using
the SW double bootstrap procedure we estimate a negative relationship between
the two variables. Using standard OLS, Tobit, and truncated regressions (with no
bias correction of efficiency), we also find a negative coefficient on health insurance
coverage. However, standard techniques over-estimate the impact of health insurance
coverage on efficiency.21 As a robustness check we regress bias corrected efficiency
on our set of environmental variables using standard OLS, Tobit, and truncated
regressions. The results of these regressions are found in Table A.7. We find that
after correcting for the bias in efficiency, the results are similar to those obtained
through the second SW bootstrap.
The health care literature describes phenomena that are in line with the negative
relationship between health insurance coverage and efficiency. First, insurance
increases access to medical care. As the demand for care increases health care
outputs might increase. In this case, for inefficiency to occur, input consumption
has to increase faster than health care outputs in some states. Bilodeau et al.
(2002) conclude that the U.S. hospital system is overcapitalized. The authors assert
that input consumption is increasing faster as new technology is being continuously
adopted by providers of health care services. In the face of competition, providers find
20In our study, we apply a nonparametric approach to estimate efficiency. In contrast to parametric
methodologies (such as Stochastic Frontier Analysis - SFA), no restriction is imposed on the shape of
the production frontier. The results obtained from SFA are sensitive to the choice of the parametric
functional form of the production function.
21OLS, Tobit, and truncated estimation results are provided in the appendix.
19
that the optimal decision is always to adopt newly available technology. For a given
level of health care output, the increase in input consumption indicates inefficiency.
In addition, studies show that the marginal rate of substitution between labor
and capital is very low in the health care sector. Jensen and Morrisey (1986)
estimate the elasticity of substitution between medical staff and beds within hospitals
to be approximately 0.17. The low marginal rate of technical substitution creates
managerial rigidities, making it difficult to respond to changes in demand.22 Ferrier
and Valdmanis (1996) find that rural hospitals over-utilize labor relative to beds.
Input mix rigidities at the state level can play an important role in determining
efficiency. Health care systems may operate too deep into the decreasing returns to
scale region of the production function as large amounts of certain inputs are necessary
to deliver health care. In this case, systems are exposed to scale inefficiencies. Balk
(2001) presents a formal framework to analyze productivity changes and input mix
effects. We leave this investigation for future research.
2.6 Conclusions
Health care delivery input-efficiency scores are valuable because they represent a
measure of underemployed medical resources. As health care expenditures rise,
efficiency analysis is important for its ability to identify best practice health care
systems. In this paper, we bring a new methodology from the productivity analysis
literature to the health care expenditure debate. We use the Simar and Wilson (2007)
model to estimate health care delivery efficiency accounting for the environment
health systems face. In doing so, we are able to answer an important question: what
is the impact of health insurance coverage on the efficiency of health care delivery?
Modeling an individual U.S. state as a health care system, we find that a 1
percentage point increase in health insurance coverage decreases health care delivery
22Custer and Willke (1991) and Lehner and Burgess (1995) have shown that elasticity of
substitution estimates are sensitive to how physicians are defined.
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efficiency by approximately 1.3 percentage points, translating to approximately
28.77 billion dollars in additional health care expenditures. Given that recently
enacted health care reform potentially expands health insurance coverage, states
may face serious issues regarding health care expenditures. While health insurance
increases access to health care, it may reduce health care delivery efficiency, increasing
unnecessary input consumption, and generating extraneous costs for society.
Research assessing the efficiency of health care delivery systems and the effects of
environmental factors is scarce. Little is known about the channels through which
these factors operate and how they affect productivity and the input mix within the
health care industry. These insights are important in understanding how states can
deliver health care more efficiently in the face of legislated insurance expansion and
aging projections.
The relationship between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures
is complex and operates through various channels. Our results suggest that health
insurance expansions may increase health care expenditures. Nevertheless, it is
important to acknowledge the empirical evidence demonstrating that increases in
health insurance coverage reduce emergency room visits, which suggests lower health
care expenditures. Our study is not an attempt to evaluate American health care
policy. However, we shed some light on possible consequences of significant health
insurance expansions. A cost-benefit analysis is needed to provide evidence that
the benefits of the reform outweigh the potential costs highlighted by this research.
Future work should address these issues.
21
Chapter 3
Better to Be Safe than Sorry?
Impacts of a Health Insurance
Mandate on Hospitals
3.1 Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) potentially expands health
insurance to over 46 million uninsured Americans. Expanding health insurance
improves access to medical care through a reduction in medical costs borne by the
consumer. A large number of newly insured consumers has the potential to increase
overall demand for medical services. Therefore, legitimate concerns over large scale
health insurance expansion focus on the possible ramifications of rising health care
costs. However, large scale changes in health insurance may also influence the delivery
of health care. Since one objective of the ACA is to reduce medical care costs, it is
imperative to understand how a health insurance mandate impacts hospitals.
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A large body of research examines the effect of changes in health insurance
coverage on consumer utilization of care and medical expenditures.1 Since health
insurance coverage improves a consumer’s access to care, early work suggests that
health insurance expansion is one of the main drivers of increases in health care
expenditures (see Feldstein (1973b) and Weisbrod (1991)). However, the Rand
Health Insurance Experiment (RHIE) estimates an impact that is much smaller in
magnitude than this earlier research suggests (see Newhouse (1993)). While these
studies largely focus on demand for care, it remains uncertain how a large scale
health insurance expansion affects the supply side of the market. Changes in hospital
inputs and methods for delivering care that stem from changes in insurance coverage
also potentially impact health expenditures. As the first study to focus on how
health insurance coverage impacts hospitals, Finkelstein (2007) finds evidence that
the introduction of Medicare is associated with an increase in expenditures that was
four times larger than RHIE results would predict.
In order to better understand the nature of rising health care expenditures,
it is important to examine any potential impacts that occur on the supply side
of the market as a result of a legislative mandate for health insurance coverage.
Massachusetts provides a rather unique opportunity for study, because, in 2006, the
state enacted health care reform legislation known as Chapter 58. Major components
of the reform reflect those encompassed in the ACA. The main objective of the law
was to expand health insurance through a mandate that went into effect in July 2007.2
Considering demand for hospital care, Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) use Massachusetts
to examine the impact of a health insurance mandate on hospital admissions from
the emergency room (ER), patients’ average length of stay in the hospital, and total
discharges from the hospital. They find that hospital admissions from the ER and
patients’ average length of stay declined, while total hospital discharges were not
1Manning et al. (1987b),Newhouse (1993), Card et al. (2008), Currie and Gruber (1996), Dafny
and Gruber (2005), and Anderson et al. (2010) all consider different aspects of how changes in health
insurance affect consumer utilization and expenditures.
2McDonough et al. (2006) provides a comprehensive overview of the Chapter 58 legislation.
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significantly affected. Focusing on emergency outpatient care, Miller (2011) finds the
reform reduced outpatient ER visits by between 2 and 8 percent.
Extending the analysis using Massachusetts to the supply side, I employ a
reduced form empirical strategy to identify how a health insurance mandate affects
hospitals’ capacity and employment. I examine hospital utilization measures in
addition to inputs, because these measures give insight into hospitals’ expectations
of demand, which influence their input decisions. Analyzing the supply side effects
also necessitates the use of a data set which captures long run changes following the
implementation of health care reform. This improves upon the existing literature
exploiting the implementation of a health insurance mandate as a natural experiment
by identifying any potential impacts that occur later within the post-policy period.
The empirical strategy uses Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services data from
2000 to 2009 and a difference in differences approach to test whether a health
insurance mandate affects a hospital’s capacity and employment levels.3 In addition,
the examination of the impact of the insurance mandate on other utilization measures
such as total patient discharges, average daily census, a patient’s average length of
stay, and the number of ambulance trips to a hospital provides insight into a hospitals’
expectation of demand. 4
A health insurance mandate potentially affects a hospital’s input through expected
changes in the demand for care. Since a health insurance mandate increases health
insurance coverage (see Long (2008), Long et al. (2009), Yelowitz and Cannon (2010)
and Kolstad and Kowalski (2010)) and improves access to care, a large number of
newly insured consumers potentially increases overall demand for hospital services.
Insurance expansion that improves access to care may also decrease the demand
for emergency services. However, uncertainty in the magnitude and nature in which
demand for care might change as a result of the mandate make it difficult for hospitals
3Hospital capacity is the number of beds in the hospital.
4Average daily census is interpreted as how many patients are occupying beds on any given day
in the hospital. Average length of stay represents the number of days an average patient spends in
the hospital.
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to predict the amount of inputs needed in order to meet demand. This uncertainty
impacts hospitals, because managers must decide ex ante whether or not to add
hospital capacity (see Joskow (1980), Mulligan (1985), Friedman and Pauly (1981),
and Carey (1998)). Therefore, if a health insurance mandate affects the demand
for care in ways that hospitals find hard to predict, then hospitals could potentially
choose an excessive amount of capacity that could substantially add to health care
costs. In other words, it is better for a hospital to be “safe” and have idle excess
capacity rather than to be “sorry” and turn patients away. While hospitals have an
easier time adjusting their levels of employment relative to capacity in order to meet
changes in demand, uncertainty may also cause hospitals to substitute less skilled
labor for highly skilled labor or ask existing staff to work additional hours. This
stems from the fact that hospitals can add additional labor much more quickly than
capacity, therefore, they may wait for expected increases in demand to be realized,
and then subsequently add additional employees. However, training highly skilled
specialist takes time, therefore, in the period shortly after an insurance mandate filling
in with less skilled labor or existing labor is a possibility. Therefore, uncertainty in
the magnitude of changes in demand may result in hospital inefficiency if capacity is
added in larger amounts relative to realized increases in demand.
The results suggest that a health insurance mandate does not significantly affect
demand for care on the extensive margin as measured by total discharges and average
daily census. However, the reform significantly reduces patients’ average length of stay
by approximately 27%. The mandate also significantly reduces the utilization of the
most urgent type of care provided by the hospital, the ambulance. For an average
hospital the effect of the health insurance mandate reduces the number of annual
ambulance trips to the average hospital by 16%. This equates to a reduction of one
ambulance trip per day for an average hospital affected by the reform relative to
one that is not. In terms of hospital inputs, the health insurance mandate increases
overall capacity by approximately 7 beds. Since there is a decrease in the utilization
of emergency care but overall utilization is not significantly impacted, the increase
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in hospital capacity suggests that hospitals are uncertain regarding how a health
insurance mandate will affect their demand; therefore, a hospital does prefer to be
“safe”. One reason that changes in the demand for emergency care do not seem
to decrease hospital capacity is potentially due to the fact that patients, who were
previously using ambulance services and being admitted to the hospital through the
emergency room, are now arriving at the “front” door to the hospital instead.
In terms of the external validity of this study, differences between Massachusetts
and the nation should be kept in mind when assessing how changes in health
insurance affect hospitals. Massachusetts entered the individual mandate with a
higher rate of insurance coverage as compared to most states, 89% versus 84%
nationally.5 Massachusetts also had a tightly regulated insurance market prior to
the implementation of Chapter 58 that makes an individual mandate more feasible
compared to other states. Given the smaller changes in health insurance coverage in
Massachusetts, a health insurance mandate potentially has a larger effects in states
where the change in coverage is greater. Therefore, Massachusetts likely represents a
lower bound estimate of the impact of the reform on utilization and hospital inputs.
The result in this chapter also have important implications for health care costs.
While the health insurance mandate does significantly increase hospital capacity, the
magnitude of the effect suggests it is likely that the additional beds fit within the
existing structure of the hospital. Therefore, the added capacity does not suggest a
substantial increase in hospital expenditures from investments expanding the physical
structure of a hospital. The mandate also does not significantly affect a hospital’s
employment level. This utilization of inputs in the face of a health insurance mandate
should have minimal impacts on health care costs that are passed onto the consumer.
This paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the theoretical
framework, Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy and examines pre-reform trends,
Section 4 presents results, Section 5 describes a variety of robustness checks, and
Section 6 concludes.
5Insurance rates derived from rates of the uninsured provided by McDonough et al. (2006).
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3.2 Theoretical Framework
A hospital faces uncertainty regarding the demand for its services as a result of the
health insurance mandate. Fundamentally, prior to the changes in health insurance,
the number of patients arriving at a hospital at any particular point in time is subject
to large variability and a considerable portion is unpredictable (see Joskow (1980)).
The unpredictable nature of demand is primarily due to emergency health care needs
stemming from accidents and sudden illnesses.
A health insurance mandate expands health insurance coverage and improves
access to care by reducing individuals’ out of pocket costs. Therefore, a health
insurance mandate may induce individuals to seek preventative care allowing for
the identification and treatment of health issues before they become an emergency.6
Many studies corroborate that increases in health insurance coverage increase the
demand for preventative care (see Manning et al. (1987b), Newhouse (1993), Card
et al. (2008), Currie and Gruber (1996), Dafny and Gruber (2005), and Anderson et al.
(2010)). In examining Massachusetts, Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) find evidence of
increases in preventive care outside of the hospital environment. If more individuals
are seeking preventative care, than from a hospital’s perspective the predictable
portion of demand should increase as preventative care catches more illnesses and
injuries early on and procedures can be scheduled in advance. A hospital should also
expect that increases in health insurance coverage potentially decrease the demand
for emergency care.
However, a hospital faces an additional layer of uncertainty stemming from a
health insurance mandate. Uncertainty from a health insurance mandate arises
because a hospital must accurately forecast changes in the magnitude of demand in
order to provide health care services. A hospital must form an expectation about the
6It is important to note that some individuals may not be induced into this type of behavior.
Gaining health insurance could cause some types of individuals to engage in more risky behavior,
because they have insurance in the event of serious illness or accident. Therefore, these individuals
may forgo preventative care or engage in more risky health behavior due to insurance.
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magnitude of demand, because it must choose its capacity prior to the realization of
demand. This stems from the fact that it takes time to build infastructure necessary
to support hospital beds and services. Therefore, in order to choose its input levels,
a hospital minimizes its costs in the face of the demand it expects to experience.
It is generally assumed within the literature that hospitals exhibit cost minimizing
behavior over profit maximization because a large fraction of hospitals are non-profits
(see Joskow (1980) and Cowing and Holtmann (1983)). As depicted in Figure B.1,
a hospital chooses inputs (beds and labor) to minimize its cost subject to expected
demand (Qexpected). However, suppose that realized demand (Qrealized) from the health
insurance mandate is in fact greater than the hospital predicts. In the short run, a
hospital can potentially adjust its amount of labor to provide services in order to
meet realized demand, but it cannot adjust its capacity. Because patients need an
open bed in order to be admitted to the hospital, some patients have be turned away
or queued for later admission. A hospital does not wish to turn patients away or
queue them due to lack of capabilities. This is due to a fundamental mission to care
for patients in distress or concerns over future economic loss from a reputation effect
(see Joskow (1980), Mulligan (1985), Friedman and Pauly (1981)).
A hospital never wants to be in a position where realized demand is greater than
expected demand, this makes a hospital’s certainty in the magnitude of the change in
demand very important. If a hospital faces a situation such as a health insurance
mandate that makes them uncertain in their prediction of the magnitude of the
change in demand, they may have an incentive to choose a higher level of inputs
and be “safe” rather than have to turn patients away and be “sorry.” Choosing
higher levels of capacity helps ensure that hospitals avoid a situation like Figure B.1,
when they are uncertain regarding the magnitude of the change in demand. This
uncertainty has the potential to create inefficiency within a hospital. This inefficiency
results when hospital capacity is added relatively faster than corresponding increases
in realized demand. Comparing Massachusetts to other states allows for an empirical
evaluation of how a health insurance mandate affects hospital inputs. Analyzing
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hospital utilization measures that proxy for demand provides insight into hospitals’
certainty regarding realizations in demand.
3.3 Empirical Strategy and Data
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy uses annual data from 2000-2009 collected from the Centers
for Medicaid and Medicare Services and a difference in differences approach to assess
the impact of a health insurance mandate in Massachusetts on demand for care and
hospital input levels. In this context, demand for care considers utilization measures
that capture overall changes in demand for care as well as changes in demand for
emergency care. Utilization measures that proxy for overall changes in demand for
care include total patient discharges, average length of stay (ALS), and average daily
census (ADC). The demand for emergency care is captured through the number of
ambulance trips reported by the hospital. The hospital input levels are the total
number of beds and total number of employees.
Determination of the effect of a mandate is based on a break in any pre-existing
trend around the time of the introduction of the health reform in 2007. The counter-
factual assumption allowing for identification is that, absent the mandate for health
insurance, any pre-period trends continue uninterrupted. I use 7 years prior to the
implementation of the mandate in Massachusetts to constitute the pre-policy trend.
The counter-factual assumption also requires a group of hospitals not affected by the
mandate. Since the health insurance mandate impacts all hospitals in Massachusetts
this eliminates any within-state comparison groups; therefore, hospitals located in
other states around Massachusetts form the comparison group. Comparison states
include Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Washington D.C., Maryland, and Virginia. The basic
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difference in differences specification is:
yijt = α+ β(MA ∗After)jt + γ(MA)i + ρ(After)t + δ′Xjt + θi + λt + νj + εijt (3.1)
The dependent variable is a utilization measure or input, y, in hospital i, in state,
j, in year t. The coefficient, β, gives the impact of the policy on hospital utilization
and inputs. It represents the change in utilization measures and inputs after the
reform relative to before the reform in Massachusetts as compared to other states.
By construction, it is the interaction of the variables MA and After, where MA is
an indicator variable equal to one if the hospital is in Massachusetts and the After
variable represents the time period after the policy was implemented. Since annual
data are used, 2007-2009 is considered as the post-policy time period in whichAfter =
1. Equation 3.1 also includes a vector of time varying state variables, Xjt, to control
for differences between hospitals in Massachusetts and those in other comparison
states. Inclusion of these variables strengthens the assumption that there are no other
factors outside the reform that affected Massachusetts relative to the other states in
the post-reform period. This assumption is a critical to the validity of the difference
in differences approach. These controls include factors such as population, income,
poverty, education, health status, employment, and health insurance coverage. The
inclusion of θi (an individual hospital fixed effect), νj (a state fixed effect), and λt
(year fixed effect) eliminates time invariant effects.
A second specification captures the effect of the policy in a specific year in the
post reform period. This specification includes 3 variables (MA*Year07, MA*Year08,
and MA*Year09 ) in place of the MA*After in Equation 3.1. These variables are the
interaction of MA and a specific year of the post-policy period. Given the long
time series dimension of the data and that the treatment variable itself changes
very little over time, serial correlation within the difference in differences context
is common. The presence of serial correlation means that the standard error of β̂ is
severely understated and can lead to incorrect identification of policy impacts. To
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account for these issues, I use a block bootstrapping method purposed by Bertrand
et al. (2004). Since Massachusetts constitutes the only treatment state, Kolstad
and Kowalski (2010) suggest the implementation of the method utilizing a large
number of bootstrap replications. All reported standard errors reflect 2000 bootstrap
replications.
3.3.2 Data
Data obtained from the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) hospital
cost reports includes ambulance trips, total beds (excluding newborn bassinets),
total employees, total inpatient days, and total patient discharges (total discharges
hereafter). The utilization measure, ALS, is the number of total patient days divided
by the total discharges reported by the hospital. ADC is total patient days divided
by 365.7 It is important to note that with respect to the ambulance trip data, only
a limited number of hospitals report their annual number of ambulance trips. The
data set is limited in sample size relative to the number of hospitals that report
the other utilization measures and inputs. However, the number of hospitals from
Massachusetts and the other comparison states represented within the ambulance trip
data is approximately the same percentage of the number of hospitals in the larger
data set suggesting that there is no sample selection of hospitals by state within the
ambulance data.8
Summary statistics for each dependent variable in the pre-reform and post-reform
policy period are in Table B.1 of Appendix B. Since the reform went into effect in July
2007, years 2000-2006 constitute the pre-policy period and 2007-2009 the post-policy
period. Examining utilization measures within Massachusetts, the mean number of
total discharges in Massachusetts rises from 7322 to 7851 from the pre-policy to post
policy period. In all other states, the mean number of total discharges rises from
8165 to 8678. The mean ADC in Massachusetts increases from 128 to 132 from the
7The construction of ALS and ADC follow the American Hospital Directory definitions.
8The one exception is that no hospitals within Vermont report ambulance trip data.
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pre-policy to the post-policy period, and in all other states it increases from 136 to
137. A patient’s ALS falls in Massachusetts from 37 to 31 days, while in all other
states it remains unchanged.9 In consideration of demand for emergency care, the
mean number of annual ambulance trips to hospitals in Massachusetts decreases from
2154 to 1620 trips. In all other states, the mean number of annual ambulance trips
decreases from 2041 to 1932.
Examining inputs, the mean number of beds in Massachusetts increases from 173
to 179, and the mean number of employees increases from 1116 to 1298 from the pre-
policy to post-policy period. In all other states, the mean number of beds decreases
from 188 to 187 and the number of employees increases from 1060 to 1162. Since
the difference in differences approach relies on the relative change from the pre-policy
to post-policy period for a hospital in Massachusetts compared to a hospital within
the group of comparison states, Figures B.2-B.7 illustrate the magnitude of change
for the average of utilization measures and inputs from the pre-policy to the post-
policy period. To the extent that change between the pre-policy and post-policy
period is relatively larger or smaller in Massachusetts compared to all other states is
preliminary evidence for the impact of a health insurance mandate on these measures.
Figures B.4, B.5, and B.6 are cases where the preliminary evidence of an effect on a
mandate on these variables is the strongest.
3.4 Examination of the Distribution of Demand
and Pre-Reform Trends
3.4.1 Examination of Changes in the Distribution of Demand
In order to consider the impact of a health insurance mandate on the distribution
of demand as discussed in Section 3.2, this subsection examines changes in the
9It is important to note that the data includes rehabilitation hospitals, which accounts for a
longer ALS than is found with acute care hospitals.
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distribution of the utilization measures between the pre and post-policy periods.
Figure B.8 depicts the kernel density plots of the distributions of the demand for
care as represented by total patient discharges. For Figures B.8 and B.9 only,
Massachusetts is compared to a subset of the comparison states including Connecticut,
New Hampshire, and Maine. The distributions for total discharges do not show a
significant change between the pre-policy and post-policy period for Massachusetts
or the comparison states. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S test) of the distributions
in Massachusetts fails to reject the null hypothesis that these distributions are equal
at significance level of 5%. K-S tests for the other comparisons states yield the same
failure to reject the null hypotheses.
Similar kernel density plots as those in Figure B.8 were constructed for other
utilization measures such as ALS and ADC. These plots also demonstrate no
significant difference in the distributions in the pre and post-policy period for
Massachusetts and the other states.10 K-S tests of the distributions in the pre and
post-policy period for all the states including Massachusetts fail to reject the null
hypothesis that the distributions are equal at a significance level of 5%. These results
suggest that there is no significant difference in the distribution of demand for care
in Massachusetts or the comparison states between the pre and post-policy period.
Therefore, the demand for care before and after the health insurance mandate is
fairly inelastic. To the extent that hospitals’ predict an inelastic response in these
utilization measures hospital input levels should remain largely unaffected.
Figure B.9 depicts kernel density plots of the distributions of the demand for
emergency care. All the distributions display changes between the pre and post-
policy periods. However, the K-S test of the distribution of the pre and post-policy
periods for Massachusetts rejects the null hypothesis that the distributions are equal
at a significance level of 5%. The same test fails to reject the null hypothesis for each
of the comparison states. The distribution in Massachusetts displays a noticeable
shift to the left. The suggests a reduction in mean of the distribution after the health
10These kernel density plots are available upon request.
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insurance mandate was instituted. A test for the difference in means in the pre-policy
and post-policy periods rejects the null hypothesis of equality of in means.
Since emergency care is the most unpredictable portion of demand that hospitals
face, a change in emergency care potentially indicates that the overall variance of
the distribution of demand is decreasing. To the extent that this is occurring, it can
influence hospital inputs by reducing their need to hold excess inputs. Thus, the
statistically significant changes in the distribution of demand for emergency care in
Massachusetts provides preliminary support for the theoretical framework suggesting
that a health insurance mandate potentially influences hospital input levels.
3.4.2 Examination of Trends
This subsection examines the trends of the dependent variables in pre and post-policy
periods. For evidence of an effect of the health insurance mandate in Massachusetts,
there should be a break in the pre-existing trend around the policy date. In addition,
comparison states should be on similar pre-policy trajectories but not exhibit a break
in trend around the implementation of the reform. Figures B.13-B.15 compare the
mean of total discharges, ADC, ALS, ambulance trips, beds and employees in each
year from 2000 to 2009. For the purposes of these figures only, Massachusetts is
compared to Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Examining the
breaks in pre-policy trends across all the figures, the most distinctive breaks appear
around 2006. Since the health insurance mandate in Massachusetts was enacted in
2006, but not implemented until July of 2007, these graphs provide visual evidence
of the importance of testing for anticipatory effects of the policy. Subsection 3.6.1
discusses this in further detail.
In terms of utilization measures that represent overall demand for care, Figure
B.10 shows the mean total discharges in each year from 2000-2009 for Massachusetts
and the comparison states. The comparison states are on the same pre-policy trend
meaning that the relative trajectory of the trends prior to the policy are the same
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as in Massachusetts. Following the introduction of a health insurance mandate,
there appears to be little to no break in trend suggesting that total discharges is
not affected by the reform. Figure B.11 shows mean ADC for both Massachusetts
and the comparison states. While the comparison states have similar pre-policy
trajectories, the relative change in the post-policy trends suggests little impact of
the reform. Figure B.12 shows the mean ALS. In this case, the visual evidence that
the comparison states follow the same pre-policy trajectory is not as compelling.
However, in analyzing Massachusetts, there is a distinctive break in the pre-policy
trend suggesting that the health insurance mandate potentially reduces ALS.
Analyzing the demand for emergency care, Figure B.13 shows that Massachusetts
experiences a much larger fall in the mean number of ambulance trips relative to other
states in post-policy period. This provides additional visual evidence that the health
insurance mandate potentially affects the demand for emergency care. In terms of
hospital inputs, Figures B.14 and B.15 show the annual mean number of beds and
employees from 2000-2009. In general, there seems to be very little visual evidence
of a break in pre-policy trends around 2006 and 2007. This suggests that health
insurance mandate may have little influence on hospital inputs.
3.5 Results and Discussion
Table B.2 presents the results of the overall effect of the health insurance mandate
on demand for care and hospital inputs. Examining the demand for emergency care
using the annual number of ambulance trips to the hospital in Column (1), the effect
of the health insurance mandate is significant and generates a total reduction of
approximately 326 ambulance trips. This equates to a 16% reduction in the number
of annual trips from the pre-policy period. Therefore, an average hospital affected
by the mandate experiences approximately one less ambulance trip per day. Since
the average cost of an ambulance trip is approximately $750, this reduction saves
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$274,000 dollars annually.11 The reduction implies that the health insurance mandate
induces substitution away from relying on the urgent hospital services toward more
appropriate care settings. Miller (2011) finds similar evidence in her analysis of
emergency room visits.
Columns (2-4) show the impact of a health insurance mandate on demand for care.
One potential impact of a health insurance mandate is an increase in the demand for
care resulting from a reduction in consumers’ out of pocket costs. In Columns (2) and
(3), the reform did not significantly impact hospital utilization measures such as total
number of discharges or ADC. This reflects that on the extensive margin there was no
overall change in demand for hospital services. This in conjunction with the reduction
in ambulance trips suggests that a health insurance mandate changes the nature of
care hospitals provide. Hospitals are seeing fewer patients arriving via ambulance
needing emergency services; however, these same patients are likely entering via the
“front” door, instead.
In Column (4), the health insurance mandate does significantly reduce the ALS
for a patient in the hospital. Specifically, the reform reduced the ALS of a patient
in a hospital in Massachusetts by approximately 10 days relative to one that is not.
This represents a 27% reduction in the ALS from the pre-policy period. Kolstad
and Kowalski (2010) examine a shorter period of time following the implementation
of the health insurance mandate using quarterly data from the Healthcare Cost and
Utilization Project National Inpatient Sample. They find that the insurance mandate
results in a 1% reduction in a patient’s average length of stay. The larger reduction
found in this study likely stems from two factors. First, this study uses a longer
time span following the health insurance mandate’s implementation which allows
more time for hospitals to adjust their production processes. Hospitals’ adjustment
of their production processes is stimulated by increasing pressures from insurance
companies over reimbursement prices for hospital inpatient services. These pressures
11This figure was inflated to present dollars from an average cost reported in 1998 dollars from
the Community Transportation Association.
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likely increase with time following the mandate as the newly implemented insurance
exchanges create more competition among insurance companies. As a result of
increasing price pressures, hospitals make adjustments that improve their throughput
of patients. Second, the CMS data used in this study include rehabilitation hospitals
which in general have a longer ALS and increase the overall magnitude of the ALS
estimate. Estimating the same specification and limiting the ALS to less than 5.42
days (which is the base number of days used by Kolstad and Kowalski (2010)) yields
a 0.08 % reduction in ALS.12
Columns (5)-(6) show the impact of the health insurance mandate on hospital
inputs. The reform increases hospital capacity by approximately 7 beds but does
not significantly affect the number of employees. This adjustment of inputs suggests
that hospitals forecasted an increase in demand as a result of a health insurance
mandate. Since hospitals thought that there was potential for demand to increase
in response to the mandate, they adjusted their capacity in order to be “safe” as
depicted in Figure B.1. However, since the mandate did not significantly increase
hospital employment, this suggests that hospitals were uncertain in their predictions.
If hospitals were certain that demand was going to increase, then they also would have
added additional employees. However, due to their uncertainty, hospitals did not add
additional employees because adjusting labor as an input is much easier than adding
capacity. In addition, hospitals also have the ability to have existing workers take
on more hours to cover any initial increases in demand resulting from the mandate.
Evidence that existing workers worked longer hours is supported by the impact of the
health insurance mandate has on payroll expenditures. 13
Table B.3 illustrates the timing of the impact of the health insurance mandate on
hospital utilization and inputs. Since this study uses annual data, one benefit is that
12The estimated coefficient is not significant given the limited cluster size that occurs using hospital
data from the CMS rather than individual data on hospital inpatients from the Healthcare Cost and
Utilization Project National Inpatient Sample.
13Preliminary analysis of the data supports that the health insurance mandate increases hospital
payroll expenditures.
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the post-reform period is longer allowing for identification of slower moving effects
of the reform.14 The results show the effect of the health insurance mandate in each
specific year (2007, 2008, and 2009) of the post-reform period.
In Column (1), the health insurance mandate significantly decreases the number
of ambulance trips in 2007; however, the impact does not remain significant in 2008
and 2009. The estimated coefficient suggests that an average hospital affected by the
mandate experiences a daily reduction of 1.2 ambulance trips in 2007 relative to one
that is not. The timing of the effect of the mandate shows that there is a one time
reduction in ambulance trips that is not sustained. This implies that the benefits
from improved access to care in terms of use of the most urgent emergency services,
ambulances, is short lived.
With respect to total discharges and ADC (Columns (2) and (3)), the effect of
the mandate was not significant in any of the individual years of the post-reform
period. These results reinforce those found in Table B.2 suggesting that the health
insurance mandate does not impact the demand for hospital services. However, the
health insurance mandate does have a significant impact on ALS in 2007, 2008, and
2009 (Column (4)). The magnitude of the reduction in ALS also increases in each
subsequent year. In 2007, the reduction in ALS for the average hospital affected by the
reform is approximately 5 days. By 2009, the magnitude of the effect is approximately
16 days. The prolonged decrease in ALS in the post-reform period implies one of
two outcomes from the mandate. First, as discussed earlier, the pricing pressures
from insurance companies continue to force hospitals to improve their throughput of
patients in subsequent years following the mandate. Second, the insurance mandate
is affecting individuals’ overall health. Potentially, through better preventative care
measures, individuals are getting healthier and seeking hospital services that do not
14From an empirical standpoint, the CMS data for 2010 is not included because the sample size of
reporting hospitals is incomplete. In 2010, the number of hospitals reporting data is 2,864 hospitals
as opposed to approximately 6,000 hospitals for 2000-2009. As this data becomes available, a better
assessment of the timing of the effects of the mandate on utilization and inputs would include this
year of data.
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require as lengthy stays within the hospital as in the pre-reform period. This second
explanation seems less plausible given that there should also be continued reductions
regarding the use of ambulance services in conjunction with ALS.
The health insurance mandate also increases the hospital capacity in 2007 and
2008 but was not significant in 2009 (Column (5)). An average hospital affected
by the mandate increases capacity by 6 beds in 2007 and 7 beds in 2008. Kolstad
and Kowalski (2010) suggest that one means of improving hospital efficiency is to
make smaller increases in capacity relative to demand following the reform. The
addition of hospital capacity without a corresponding change in utilization suggests
that hospitals are actually becoming more inefficient.15 This inefficiency is likely due
to demand uncertainty. The uncertainty is demonstrated by the fact that hospitals
expected increases in demand in 2007 and 2008; therefore, they added beds in those
years. However, once the corresponding realizations of demand did not occur in those
years, hospitals did not continue adding anymore beds. This is supported by the fact
that hospitals did not continue to increase capacity in 2009. The increase in capacity
in 2007 and 2008 also suggests that it is unlikely that supply-side constraints limited
total discharges that would have been driven by expanded health insurance coverage.
The mandate also did not affect the total number of employees in any of the individual
years in the post-reform period (Column (6)). This further suggests that increases




The examination of trends in Subsection 3.4.2 suggests breaks in the pre-policy
trends potentially occur as early as 2006. Since the health insurance mandate in
15This is further evidence of the mechanism discussed within Chapter 2.
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Massachusetts was enacted in 2006 but not fully implemented until July 2007. It is
important to consider that hospitals may have expected increases in demand prior to
2007 and adjusted their inputs as early as 2006.
Table B.4 shows results of a specification that designates 2006 as part of the
post-policy period along with 2007-2009. Piehl et al. (2003) point out that defining
a dummy variable for the post-policy period and testing for a change in mean or
other parameters can be conceptually flawed even when the start date of the program
is known. This is due the fact that anticipatory effects from the health insurance
mandate potentially impact the timing of the effects on hospitals. This causes the
post-policy dummy variable (After) to not actually enter at the appropriate time for
evaluating the effect of the policy. Therefore, Piehl et al. (2003) propose using a test
for structural change of an unknown break point developed by Andrews (1993), as a
way to consider if anticipatory effects are influencing the evaluation of a policy. They
use a supremum of Wald statistics to determine where the break for the policy affect
occurs. The supremum of Wald statistics is similar to a maximum F-statistic from a
Chow test evaluated over all the possible breakpoints.
Table B.4 shows the same pattern of significance as those in Table B.2, when
evaluated based on t-statistics. The health insurance mandate significantly reduces
the number of ambulance trips to the hospital and average length of stay. These
effects are significant at the 10% level. The health insurance mandate also significantly
increases hospital capacity. This effect is significant at the 5% level. In each instance,
the magnitude of the effect is smaller. Just as in Table B.2, the policy also does not
significantly influence total discharges or the number of employees.
A comparison of the specifications in Table B.2 and Table B.4 based on the
supremum Wald Statistic suggests that the break point occurred in 2006 for annual
ambulance trips and hospital capacity, and in 2007 for ALS. These findings of
anticipatory effects are consistent with the expected behavior of individuals and
hospitals in response to the health insurance mandate. Since the health insurance
mandate was enacted in 2006, individuals responded by acquiring health insurance
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prior to its implementation in 2007. The access in health insurance in 2006 had
the immediate effect of increases individuals use of preventative care and reducing
the number of ambulance trips to the hospital. Hospitals also immediately expected
an increase in demand as a result of the policy and adjusted their capacity as soon
as the health insurance mandate was enacted. The fact that the supremum Wald
statistic selected the model where the policy begins in 2007 for ALS reinforces that the
insurance companies as a result of pressures from the insurance exchange put pressure
on hospitals which subsequently forced them to adjust their production processes.
3.6.2 Controlling for Heterogeneity in Hospital Size
Table B.5 presents results that show the effect of the policy in the post-mandate
period. This specification differs from Table B.2 in that the log of the utilization
measures and inputs are the dependent variable. Finkelstein (2007) suggests using
the log of hospital outcomes and inputs to account for the fact that hospitals vary
considerably in size. In general, the results of Table B.5 are very similar those in
Table B.2 suggesting that the results are robust to heterogeneity in hospital size.
In terms of utilization measures, this specification demonstrates that the health
insurance mandate significantly affects ALS but does not significantly affect total
discharges and ADC. The effect of the reform on ALS is significant at the 10% level
in this specification. In comparison to Table B.2, the effect of the mandate on ALS
was significant at the 5% level. Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) discuss that taking the
log of the ALS puts relatively more weight on shorter length of stays. Therefore,
since the specification in Table B.2 has a tighter confidence interval than in this
specification, the reform has more of an impact on longer length of stays. This is
consistent with their findings that is based upon data with a shorter post-mandate
period than the data used in this paper. In addition, this specification also shows
that a health insurance mandate does not significantly reduces the annual number of
ambulance trips to the hospital. This result is the only one that differs in significance
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as compared to Table B.2. It suggests that the annual number of ambulance trips
is differentially affected by larger hospitals. This result is not necessarily surprising
as larger hospitals likely have a greater fleet of ambulances. In addition, the health
mandate also increases hospital capacity, but does not significantly affect hospital
employment. These impacts are consistent with the findings in Table B.2.
3.7 Conclusion
While recent studies use Massachusetts to investigate the impacts of the health
insurance mandate on insurance coverage and consumer utilization, I take a novel
approach by considering the potential impacts on hospital inputs. The empirical
strategy uses a difference in differences approach to assess the impacts of a health
insurance mandate on hospitals’ capacity and employment. Analyzing supply side
effects necessitates the use of data that captures slow moving changes in these
measures. This offers an additional advantage over the previous work by identifying
long run impacts that occur later within the post-policy period. In addition to hospital
inputs, I also examine hospital utilization measures, because they give insight into
hospitals’ forecasts of demand for care, which influence the choice of input levels.
The results suggest that a health insurance mandate significantly increases a
hospital’s capacity but does not significantly affect its employment levels. This
adjustment of inputs arises because a hospital expects an increase in demand as
a result of a health insurance mandate. Therefore, it adjusts its capacity in order to
be “safe,” rather than face being “sorry” for having to turn patients away. However,
because the labor input is easier to adjust than capacity, a hospital waits to adjust
its employment levels until its forecast of demand is realized.
The health insurance mandate does not significantly affect utilization of hospital
services such as total discharges and ADC. Therefore, demand for hospital care
remains fairly inelastic in response to the health insurance mandate. Thus, a
hospital’s expectation of increases in demand are never realized, and it does not
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adjust its employment level. The uncertainty regarding changes in demand also
creates inefficiency within a hospital, because a hospital adds capacity but there
is not a corresponding increase in the utilization of hospitals services.
These results also have important implications for health care costs. While a
health insurance mandate significantly increases hospital capacity, the magnitude of
the effect suggests it is likely that the additional beds fit within the existing structure
of the hospital. Therefore, in the case of Massachusetts, the added capacity does not
suggest a substantial increase in hospital expenditures from investments expanding
the physical structure of a hospital. Also, the mandate does not significantly affect
employment within a hospital. This use of inputs resulting from a health insurance
mandate should have minimal impacts on health care costs that are passed onto
the consumer. While analyzing Massachusetts provides insights into the potential
impact of the ACA on the supply side of the market, the results of this study
should interpreted with caution. Larger changes in health insurance coverage from
an insurance mandate potentially create larger amounts of uncertainty, which may
lead to larger investments in capacity. This in turn could have very different impacts
on health care costs. In addition, further research is necessary to determine if over





Expenditure Curves: Does Health
Insurance Matter?
4.1 Introduction
Before the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) was enacted in
March, 2010, 18 state governors wrote to members of Congress concerned about
the legislation’s impact on state expenditures.1 Their letters reflect a growing belief
that PPACA is an unfunded mandate, because its required expansion of Medicaid
might increase state expenditures on health to unsustainable levels. With the
depletion of rainy day funds and depressed tax revenues stemming from the 2008-
2009 recession, many states continue to face budgetary deficits making any growth in
these expenditures an even more pressing issue.
With debate surrounding health care reform intensifying, significant attention is
being given to the impact of changes in health insurance coverage on health care
expenditures. Early research by Feldstein (1973b) suggests that expansion of heath
1Republican.Sentate.Gov, http://republican.senate.gov/healthcare/governors/ (accessed on
05/15/2011).
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insurance coverage was a rudimentary cause of the increase in health expenditures.
This is due to the fact that health insurance expansion increases the demand for
medical services, because individuals’ out of pocket costs are reduced. The increase
in demand for services increases the overall price of medical care, when supply is
less than perfectly elastic, subsequently increasing overall health expenditure. Recent
studies find differing impacts of the effect of a policy driven change in health insurance
on health expenditure. Using geographic variation in health insurance coverage from
the implementation of Medicare, Finkelstein (2007) finds its introduction accounts
for a 37% increase in real hospital expenditures for all ages. However, examining the
impact of a health insurance mandate in Massachusetts, Kolstad and Kowalski (2010)
find no evidence that the mandate increased the cost of hospital care.2 In light of
this research and to address budgetary pressures that states might face as a result
of national health care reform, it is imperative to consider the potential impact of
changes in health insurance coverage on state Medicaid expenditure.
There are a number of reasons to believe that private and public health insurance
coverage could impact state Medicaid expenditure. For instance, the growth in private
health insurance could increase the growth in Medicaid expenditure through a pricing
channel that puts pressure on reimbursement rates. However, if reimbursement rates
are largely unaffected by the private market and prices remain fixed, then growth
in Medicaid expenditure is affected through those who are insured under Medicaid
coverage. The effect of the growth in Medicaid coverage on Medicaid expenditure can
be viewed as a quantity channel. In essence, a greater number of those with Medicaid
coverage increase the demand for care because more individuals are insured. However,
growth in Medicaid insurance could potentially decrease the growth of Medicaid
2The difference in these findings maybe driven by the fact that the Finkelstein (2007) study was a
general equilibrium analysis where the Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) study was a partial equilibrium
analysis. Finkelstein (2007) argues that market wide changes in health insurance alters the nature
in which medical care is practiced in ways that small scale changes do not. She finds evidence that
the introduction of Medicare is associated with substantial new hospital entry. It is possible that
the mandate in Massachusetts was not large enough to change the nature of medical care practice,
and subsequently, another reason that Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) find no evidence that cost of
hospital care increased.
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expenditures if better access to preventative care leads to improved health outcomes
and a decrease in chronic illness meaning less expenditure. The reasons driving these
effects and others are more broadly discussed in Section 2.
In this paper, I use state-level panel data from 1996-2004 to examine the
impact of annual growth in private and public types of insurance coverage on the
growth in Medicaid expenditure. Due to recent concerns over sustainability of these
expenditures, one important contribution of this study is the focus on determinants
of this specific type of expenditure rather than total health expenditures. For my
study, Medicaid expenditure is considered to be state expenditure on Medicaid net of
federal matching dollars. Only one other study focuses on state funded expenditure
of Medicaid. Adams and Wade (2001) use data from 1984-1992 to examine the fiscal
response of states to the federal matching rate and find states substitute federal funds
for state generated revenues. Given research finding this substitution by states, I use
more recent data to examine other potential determinants of growth in the states’
portion of Medicaid expenditure.
Early work by Holahan and Cohen (1986) and Buchanan et al. (1991) find
states’ income and physician to population ratio affect state Medicaid expenditure
inclusive of federal dollars; however, these studies do not focus on growth and
the impacts of private and public health insurance coverage. This study considers
an exhaustive specification that focuses on many other potential determinants of
state funded Medicaid expenditure growth in addition to income and physicians
such as spillover effects in neighbors’ spending, political ideology, socioeconomic
factors affecting health status and utilization of care, as well as private and public
health insurance coverage. The consideration of the growth in neighbors’ spending
as a potential determinant is another important contribution, because Baicker
(2005b) finds evidence of spillover effects in neighbors’ spending on social services
which includes both Medicaid and welfare expenditures together. Further, research
examining health expenditure growth primarily focuses on total national-level health
care expenditure. Early work by Newhouse (1977), Leu (1986), and Parkin et al.
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(1987) finds that growth in gross domestic product (GDP) is positively correlated to
the growth of health care expenditures. More recently, Roberts (1999) and Gerdtham
and Jonsson (2000) stress the importance of exploring other potential determinants of
health care expenditure growth. Beginning this effort, Hartwig (2008) and Potrafke
(2010) identify wage productivity and certain types of political ideology as important
factors.
Taking the growth literature into consideration, another novel contribution of
this paper is the use of growth rates to evaluate of the impact of health insurance
coverage on state funded Medicaid expenditure (Medicaid expenditure hereafter).
With policy discussions focused on factors that influence states’ ability to bend
their Medicaid expenditure curves, the examination of growth rates allows for direct
application of empirical findings to inform these discussions. In addition, growth rates
give insight into long term trends that drive health care costs. Analyzing trends is
particularly salient because individuals who have health conditions today are likely to
have the same conditions or side effects from these conditions in the future requiring
additional care and subsequent expenditure. Currently, the treatment of chronic
health conditions accounts for over 75% of national health care expenditures.3
When considering the growth of Medicaid expenditures, it is important to account
for the fact that growth in the previous periods could inherently affect growth in
the current time period. This inertia in health care spending may result from time
trends and semi-durability of consumption that arises from chronic health conditions
(Okunade and Suraratdecha (2000)). Therefore, this study also makes a contribution
by using a dynamic panel specification that explicitly accounts for the inertia of health
care spending. The use of a dynamic panel estimator is necessary because inclusion of
previous periods of Medicaid expenditure as explanatory variables causes endogeniety
problems for traditional estimation of panel data. Dynamic panel estimators provide
3Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Chronic Disease Overview,
http://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/overview/index.htm, accessed on (07/20/2011).
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a consistent and efficient estimator because instruments for endogenous explanatory
variables are generated from variables already specified within the model.
The results imply that although the growth in private health insurance does not
have a statistically significant impact on the growth of Medicaid expenditure, growth
in Medicaid insurance increases Medicaid expenditure. However, this Medicaid
insurance impact is only statistically significant in static specifications that do not
allow for past periods of Medicaid expenditure growth to influence the present period.
In dynamic specifications that account for this trend in health care spending, the
growth of Medicaid coverage does not have a statistically significant impact. These
specifications potentially reflect that increases in Medicaid insurance allow individuals
to become more informed regarding health and wellness which improves health
outcomes reducing expenditures on chronic conditions. Alternatively, inclusion of
this trend could reflect that states choose to control expenditure growth through a
reduction in Medicaid benefits after experiencing budgetary pressures from growth
in Medicaid expenditures in previous periods. This reduction in Medicaid benefits is
equivalent to substitution at the intensive margin.
Given that health care reform is expected to expand health insurance coverage to
up to 46.3 million uninsured Americans, this research sheds light on how Medicaid
expenditure may be affected.4 Since projected estimates of Medicaid insurance growth
from health care reform are in line with previous growth from 1996-2004, empirical
evaluation gives us an indication of whether states’ fears regarding an unfunded
mandate are legitimate. From a dynamic panel model perspective, evidence from
this paper suggests that growth in health insurance coverage is not likely to influence
the growth in Medicaid expenditures, and that aging of the population represents a
more critical concern.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes a conceptual framework for
the impact of health insurance and other the determinants of Medicaid expenditure,
4U.S. Census Bureau: Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States:
2008, Current Population Reports, page 20, issued September 2009.
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Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy and data, Section 4 presents results, Section
5 offers a discussion, and Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Determinants of Medicaid Expenditure Growth
Regarding the literature on health care expenditure growth, research at the state-
level is limited and primarily focuses on empirical techniques surrounding total
health expenditure’s cointegration with state gross domestic product (see Freeman
(2003),Wang and Rettenmaier (2007), and Moscone and Tosetti (2010)). Due to
previous emphasis on empirical methods, an investigation of a wide variety of previous
literature and theory is necessary to consider the broadest possible set of determinants
of Medicaid expenditure growth. Theories of government expenditure generally tend
to focus on either: 1) the supply-side which deals with the government’s provision
of services or 2) the demand-side working through political economy mechanisms.
Supply side theories suggest the government is responsible for the provision of
services, while most early demand theories allow for the determination of services to
depend upon the median voter (Downs (1957)). However, the public sector does not
necessarily provide the level of service the median voter wants. Romer and Rosenthal
(1979) explain this by demonstrating that a budget-maximizing elected official can
manipulate the alternatives presented to the electorate enabling political outcomes
other than those preferred by the median voter. Therefore, demand side theories
suggest that variation in government expenditure is potentially a function of electoral
rules, type of government, and degree of political participation.
In this paper, the framework for identifying potential determinants of Medicaid
expenditure considers both supply-side and demand-driven factors. Representing
the supply side are a variety of socio-economic factors inherent in the population
that potentially affect the provision of services through utilization. Demand-driven
factors include spillover effects from interstate competition and a measure of the
political environment within a state.
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4.2.1 Health Insurance Coverage
There are many ways in which the growth in private and public health insurance
coverage potentially affects Medicaid expenditure growth. In this analysis, Medicaid,
Medicare, and military health insurance represent the differing forms of public
coverage. The growth in private coverage potentially works through a price channel,
while changes in Medicaid coverage work through a quantity channel. The growth in
military and Medicare coverage may impact Medicaid expenditure growth if changes
in these programs’ reimbursement rates impact Medicaid reimbursement rates. The
effect of private coverage is discussed first followed by Medicaid coverage. The impacts
of military and Medicare coverage are considered together.
The growth in private health insurance potentially has a positive or null effect on
the growth in Medicaid expenditure. These effects work through a pricing channel,
which is framed by how the private market influences the price of care. Feldstein
(1973b) shows that health insurance expansion increases the demand for medical
services. The increase in demand for services stems from the fact that individuals’ out
of pocket costs are reduced; therefore, they are only partially incurring the marginal
cost for utilized care. This means that as insurance expands more individuals use more
services, because previously uninsured individuals’ marginal cost of care is reduced.
In the case of the positive effect, this increase in demand for services is large enough
to increase the overall price of medical care, when supply is less than perfectly elastic,
and puts pressure on Medicaid reimbursement rates.
The pressure on Medicaid reimbursement rates comes from behavior on the part
of medical practitioners. These practitioners could select to see privately insured
patients over those on Medicaid, because reimbursement rates from private insurance
companies more accurately reflect the increasing price of care. Previous studies
find that physicians do in fact alter their behavior toward patients based upon
reimbursement rates. Specifically, increases in reimbursement rates lead to an increase
in the number of private physicians willing to treat Medicaid patients (Decker (2007)),
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an increase in the length of time spent with patients (Decker (2007)), as well as a
larger portion of the practice being devoted to Medicaid patients (Baker and Royalty
(2000)). Subsequently, states are potentially induced to increase their reimbursement
rates, so that those with Medicaid insurance can find practitioners willing to provide
them with care. Through this channel involving the price of medical services, private
insurance growth potentially positively affects the growth in Medicaid expenditure.
However, private insurance could also have no impact on the growth of Medicaid
expenditure. If the price of medical services does not change when more individuals
gain insurance through the private market, then an increase in private coverage
potentially does not affect the growth of Medicaid expenditure. This could stem
from the possibility that those who have private insurance come from the healthiest
segments of the population requiring very few medical services beyond preventative
care. This means that demand for care may increase by only a small amount and fail
to push prices up enough to exert any pressure on reimbursement rates. In this case,
changes in private insurance would have no effect on changes in Medicaid expenditure
growth.
Besides the effect from the private insurance, the growth in Medicaid coverage
could also have a positive or null effect on the growth of Medicaid expenditure.
These effects function through a quantity channel, because the growth in Medicaid
insurance increases the quantity of patients potentially requiring care under Medicaid.
A positive effect stems from the fact that the growth in the number of insured on
Medicaid increases the demand for care, and in turn increases the growth of Medicaid
expenditure. Adams and Wade (2001) find a significant positive relationship between
the number of enrollees and Medicaid expenditure in levels. However, an increase
in Medicaid coverage may not necessarily guarantee an increase in the growth of
Medicaid expenditure. If the growth in Medicaid insurance improves access to
preventative care, which in turn increases awareness regarding health and wellness
issues, then health outcomes might improve leading to a reduction in expenditures
on chronic conditions. Alternatively, a null effect maybe supported by the fact that
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states may adjust the services they choose to reimburse as eligibility expands in order
to maintain costs. Howard (2010) points out it is not certain that states will maintain
the health care benefits at original levels when Medicaid enrollment expands. Baicker
(2005a) also finds evidence that states substitute health benefits for eligibility in order
to maintain costs. In this case, if the substitution of benefits for costs generated by
increased coverage is great enough, the growth in Medicaid insurance may have no
effect on Medicaid expenditure growth.
Other forms of public coverage such as military and Medicare insurance also may
impact the growth in Medicaid expenditure. These impacts are only likely if growth in
these types of coverage influences their reimbursement rates, which in turn influences
changes in Medicaid’s reimbursement rates. In this study, it is not expected that
the growth in these types of coverage will affect the growth of Medicaid expenditure.
However, because of potential differing effects from the price and quantity channel,
empirical evaluation of the effect of growth in private and Medicaid coverage on the
growth of Medicaid expenditures is important.
4.2.2 Socioeconomic Factors
The prior literature finds that other socioeconomic factors affect the utilization
of medical services and can thus influence Medicaid expenditure through channels
outside of insurance. Therefore, controlling for other socio-economic factors that
possibly affect expenditure is imperative. Other socioeconomic factors considered as
determinants of Medicaid expenditure are: income, unemployment, health status of
the population, education, age of the population, and private health care expenditure.
In general, one would expect that wealthier states with larger income growth
would see a decline in Medicaid eligibility and a decrease in Medicaid expenditure
growth. However, tastes for redistribution of wealth might mean that wealthier states
have a greater ability to pay for Medicaid insurance within their states. Holahan
and Cohen (1986) and Buchanan et al. (1991) examine variations in the levels of
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Medicaid spending and find that states with income do spend more on their Medicaid
programs. Holahan and Cohen (1986) proxy for income using state gross domestic
product (SGDP) deflated by a gross national product price deflator. Buchanan et al.
(1991) argue that this measure does not capture cross-state differences in price levels
and utilize personal income per capita in their analysis. In this study, SGDP per
capita will proxy for income; and cross-state differences in price levels will be captured
by using a regional price deflator suggested by Matteo (2005). In light of early work,
the growth in SGDP per capita is expected to have a positive impact on the growth
of Medicaid expenditure.
Unemployment may also influence the growth of Medicaid expenditure, since a
portion of individuals who lose their jobs and possibly their employer provided health
insurance also meet Medicaid eligibility standards. While the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1986 allows workers the right to choose
to continue group health benefits with their former employer provided that these
individuals are willing to pay their employers’ share of the insurance, it is unlikely
that individuals who experience job loss and meet Medicaid eligibility standards would
be able to afford this option. In some instances, Medicaid actually helps to cover
COBRA premiums. Examining Medicaid enrollment, Adams and Wade (2001) find
that an increase in the unemployment rate increases children’s enrollment but does
not affect adult enrollment. In this study, the effect of unemployment rate growth
on Medicaid expenditure growth is likely to be positive but may not be statistically
significant.
Health status of the population within a state also potentially influences the
growth in Medicaid expenditure. Presumably, the healthier the population within
a state the less utilization of medical care services is likely needed. Less utilization
potentially means a decline or slowing of the growth in Medicaid expenditure. Health
status of the population in practice is very difficult to measure; however, lifestyle
choices likely affect the health status of a population. In general, increases in the
prevalence of diseases such as cancer and heart conditions are contributing to the
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rise in utilization of medical services. In this study, the portion of the population
that smokes will proxy for health status of the population. Smoking increases the
prevalence of disease within smokers as well as non-smokers through second-hand
effects. Smoking is closely linked as a cause of cancers such as: lung, oral cavity,
stomach, cervical, kidney, pancreas, as well as acute myeloid leukemia.5 Non-smokers
who are exposed to second hand smoke also increase their lung cancer risk by 20%
to 30%.6 In addition to cancer, secondhand smoke exposure causes an estimated
46,000 heart disease deaths annually among adult nonsmokers in the United States.
7 Those states with less smokers potentially have populations that take better care
of themselves and have lower prevalence of disease requiring less care for chronic
conditions. This reduces the growth of Medicaid expenditures by reducing the demand
for medical services. Thus, the growth the portion of the non-smoking portion of the
population is expected to decrease the growth in Medicaid expenditure.
Along with health status, education within the state also potentially affects the
growth of Medicaid expenditure. Grossman (1972) contends that individuals with
more education have a better ability to care for themselves and are more efficient in
the production of health. Individuals with higher levels of education may be more
informed regarding health and wellness, which may lead to better health outcomes
through preventative measures and less demand for care of chronic conditions. Cutler
and Lleras-Muney (2006) find that education contributes to better reasoned choices
regarding health related behaviors. This in turn reduces the demand for medical
services and decreases Medicaid expenditure growth. Therefore, the growth in
individuals with higher levels of education could decrease the growth in Medicaid
5Surgeon General’s Report, 2004, Office on Smoking and Health, National Center for Chronic
Disease Prevention and Health Promotion. pp.137, 167, 170, 183, 254, 324-325.
6U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The Health Consequences of Involuntary
Exposure to Tobacco Smoke: A Report of the Surgeon General. Atlanta: U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Coordinating Center for
Health Promotion, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Office
on Smoking and Health, 2006 (accessed July 22, 2011).
7Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Smoking Attributable Mortality, Years of Potential
Life Lost, and Productivity Losses United States, 2000-2004, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
2008; 57(45):1226-8 (July 22, 2011).
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expenditures. However, in the event that individuals with higher education are
confronted with an illness, they may potentially seek out more second opinions
regarding a diagnosis than those with less education. In addition, these individuals
may spend time searching for more innovative and costly treatments contributing to
the rise in expenditures. In this study, the portion of the population with at least a
bachelor’s degree will proxy for educational attainment within states. It is expected
that an increase in the growth of education likely decreases the growth in Medicaid
expenditure.
In addition, age distribution of the population also potentially influences Medicaid
expenditure growth. The portion of the population over 65 years of age has more
chronic conditions requiring more medical care. In fact, 90.7% of this population
have one or more chronic conditions. 8 As life expectancy of this group is increases,
this portion of the population has an increased probability of developing a chronic
condition and also requires longer periods of care for those conditions. A rise in the
number of chronic conditions increases utilization of medical services contributing to
Medicaid expenditure growth. Medicaid expenditure growth is potentially affected
because even though this portion of the population qualifies for Medicare insurance,
some individuals who qualify can use Medicaid benefits as supplemental insurance.9
In addition, Medicaid also covers long term care for qualified individuals age 65 and
over. Aging as an explanation for increases in total health care expenditure has been
investigated within the literature yielding mixed conclusions. Zweifel et al. (1999)
find evidence to support that aging is not a significant cause of the rise in total
health care expenditure when age in relationship to death is controlled for. However,
Werblow et al. (2007) find that age of population does matter especially with respect
to long term care. Seshamani and Gray (2004) refine econometric techniques in
previous studies and conclude that both aging and age in relationship to death impact
8Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, www.rwjf.org/files/research/50968chronic.care.chartbook.ppt,
(accessed on July 22, 2010).
9Information found at http://www.medicaid.ms.gov/EligibilityGuides/AgedDisabledEligibility.pdf
assessed on 07/11/2011.
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rising hospital expenditure. In light of the relationship between this portion of the
population, the prevalence of chronic conditions, and utilization of medical services,
it is expected that growth in this portion of the population will increase the growth
in Medicaid expenditure.
While the share of the population 65 and over will likely affect Medicaid
expenditure growth, so too will the share of the portion of the population that is
17 and under. The growth in this portion of the population may either increase or
decrease the growth in Medicaid expenditure. This portion of the population often
requires more preventative care which is associated with an increase in utilization and
expenditure. However, this portion of the population also has the lowest percentage
of chronic conditions. Only 27% of children ages 0-19 have one or more chronic
conditions as compared to 40% for individuals ages 20-44, 68.0% for ages 45-64, and
the 90.7% of those 65 and older. 10 Since chronic conditions account for 75% of all
health care spending, it is expected that the utilization for chronic care out weights
that of preventative care. 11 Therefore, an increase in the portion of the population
17 and under is expected to cause a decrease in Medicaid expenditure.
One other important factor that potentially influences the growth of Medicaid
expenditure is private health care expenditure. On one hand, private health
expenditure could be a substitute for Medicaid expenditure. If more individuals
have the ability to pay for their own care, then there is less of a need for Medicaid
expenditure. In examination of determinants of public health care spending for OECD
countries, Potrafke (2010) found a negative relationship between private and public
health expenditure. However, increases in private health care expenditure could also
have a positive effect on Medicaid expenditure through the price channel. If the
growth in private health care expenditure is large enough, it could increase the price
of care through increases in utilization and put pressure on government reimbursement
10Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, www.rwjf.org/files/research/50968chronic.care.chartbook.ppt,
(accessed on July 22, 2010).
11Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Chronic Disease Overview,
http://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/overview/index.htm, accessed on (07/20/2011).
56
rates. In this study, it is expected that private health care expenditure will work as
a substitute for Medicaid expenditure, rather than through the price channel. Thus,
the expected impact of an increase in private health care expenditure growth is a
decrease in Medicaid expenditure growth.
4.2.3 Interstate Competition
While socio-economic factors play an important role as determinants of Medicaid
expenditure growth, spillover effects from interstate competition and the political
environment are important demand side factors that deserve consideration. Because
interstate competition likely causes spillover effects from neighboring states, it is
important to acknowledge the role that these states have on expenditure. The idea of
a “neighbor” state was first defined within the interstate competition literature that
focused on tax competition (Case and Hines (1993), Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998),
Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Buettner (2001), and Rork (2003)) and program
adoption (Brueckner (1998) and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002)).
States are potentially influenced by the spending of their neighbors for several
reasons. First, states could be worried about that the benefits they offer for health
care are more generous than other states. If their benefits are more generous, than
individuals may have an incentive to move into that state putting an upward pressure
on expenditures due to an increase in the base of individuals receiving those benefits.
Potentially, states engage in a “race to the bottom” spawned by fears that excessive
generosity creates unsustainable growth in Medicaid expenditure. Second, states also
potentially react to actions of neighboring states because of yardstick competition.
Yard stick competition occurs because voters judge how elected officials in their state
are performing based on benchmark conditions from neighboring states. Baicker
(2005b) suggests that voters do benchmark their state’s performance against other
states when considering health initiatives.
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Previous studies find evidence that interstate competition affects expenditures.
Specifically, Case et al. (1993) find per capita state government expenditure is
positively and significantly affected by the expenditure of its neighbors. Figlio et al.
(1999), Saavedra (2000), and Wheaton (2000) find spillover effects in welfare spending.
Baicker (2005b) uses individual shocks to states’ spending on Medicaid to isolate the
influence on neighboring state spending and finds that each dollar of state spending
causes an increase in neighboring states spending of approximately 90 cents. Because
the literature identifies relatively large spillover effects, this study will consider the
potential for interstate competition as a determinant of the growth in Medicaid
expenditure. It is expected that an increase in the growth of neighbor spending
increases the growth of Medicaid expenditure.
In addition to interstate competition, variation in Medicaid expenditure could be
explained as a function of the political environment within a state. Potentially, the
extent to which the state is run by liberals or conservatives could affect how much
is spent by the state on health care. Cromwell et al. (1987) found that when other
factors were held constant, Medicaid enrollment rates were higher in more liberal
states. However, Buchanan et al. (1991) found that a liberal index (based on the
average ratings given to each state’s delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives)
was not significant in explaining Medicaid expenditure. In this study, the political
environment is proxied for by considering whether the majority of the state legislature
is held by Democrats or Republicans. An increase in the Democratic majority within
the state legislature could have a a positive effect on Medicaid expenditure; however,
in light of the Buchanan et al. (1991) study, this effect is not expected to be significant.
In addition, the political environment within a state could also encompass political
interest groups that may try to influence Medicaid expenditure growth. If the medical
industry can lobby for less restrictive criteria and higher payments, then Medicaid
expenditure growth could increase. This means that the growth in the number of
physicians is also an important control variable because it proxies for the power of
political interest groups within a state as well as other potential influences. It is
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expected that as the growth of the number of physicians within a state has a positive
effect on the growth of Medicaid expenditure.
4.3 Empirical Specification and Data
In this paper, I use state-level panel data from 1996-2004 capitalizing on within-state
variation to identify whether growth in private and public types of health insurance
coverage influences Medicaid expenditure growth.12 I choose to focus on growth rates,
because growth rates give insight into long term trends that drive health care costs.
Analyzing trends is also important because individuals who have health conditions
today are likely to have the same conditions or side effects from these conditions in
the future requiring additional care and subsequent expenditure.
The dependent variable is Medicaid expenditure growth per capita, orMedicaidexp.
To capture, the portion of Medicaid expenditure that states fund vice the portion
which is subsidized by the federal matching grants, I follow Adams and Wade
(2001). Real state funded Medicaid expenditure is constructed as real Medicaid
expenditures times (1 − FMAP ), where FMAP represents the Federal Medical
Assistance Percentage. This measure is divided by the total population and then
a growth rate is calculated to form Medicaidexp. While revenues raised through
special tax and donation programs were of concern during the Adams and Wade
(2001) time period of study, I utilize data after the passage of the Medicaid Voluntary
Contribution and Provider Specific Tax Amendments of 1991 which curtailed the use
of these programs.




12DC, Alaska, and Hawaii are excluded from the analysis.
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where i = 1, ..., n denotes a state, and t = 1, ..., T , a year. PrivateHI, represents
the growth of the share of the population with private health insurance coverage.
PublicHI represents 3 separate variables included in the specification: 1) the growth
of the share of population with Medicaid health insurance, MedicaidHI, (2) the
growth of the share of population with Medicare insurance, MedicareHI, and (3)
the growth of the share of population with military insurance, MilitaryHI.
The term, Xit, includes the growth rates of a number of variables that proxy for the
socio-economic determinants and political environment discussed in Section 2. These
variables include the growth rate of: real state gross domestic product per capita
(SGDP), the unemployment rate (Unemployment), share of the population that
smokes (Smoke), share of the population with at least a bachelor’s degree (Bachelor
degree), share of the population 65 and over (Share65), share of the population 17 and
under (Share17), real private health care expenditures per capita (PrivateHCE ), and
the number of physicians per capita (Physicians). Two dummy variables, LowerHouse
and UpperHouse, proxy for the political environment within the state legislature. The
variables reflect the presence of democratic control in the lower and upper house of
the state legislatures in any given year. The dummy variable was constructed by
assigning a value of 1 to legislatures that had a democratic majority. Otherwise, the
variable took on a value of zero.
Interstate competition is captured through the term, IComp−it. This captures





where wij are exogenously chosen weights such that
∑
i 6=j wij = 1. Brueckner
(2003) suggests that the choice of weights is based upon prior judgment about the
pattern of interaction.
To see if neighborhood effects matter within a growth context, I follow Baicker
(2005b) and use one of her proposed weighting structures that considers geographic
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contiguity. For each of the 48 states, the weighting structure is as follows:
wij =
 1/nij j ∈ Ni0 j /∈ Ni (4.3)
such that other states that share a border become part of a set Ni, and ni = Ni.
Within the inter-state competition context, the lag of Medicaidexp growth is used in
this specification. Use of the lag of dependent variable in this context provides two
main advantages. The first advantage is that it accurately captures the time states
require to learn about changes in other states’ spending and then make the necessary
budgetary adjustments to affect their own expenditure. The second advantage is that
it deals with an econometric issue that arises from the use of the dependent variable.
Use of the dependent variable causes simultaneity bias that occurs because states
compete against each other to determine levels of government spending; therefore,
expenditures of one’s neighbors are simultaneously determined with home state
expenditures. Put another way, Tennessee’s Medicaid expenditures may be affected
by Medicaid policy decisions within Alabama, and in turn Alabama responds, which
affects Tennessee’s policy decisions. Lastly, ηi represents any potential state fixed
effect not eliminated by the growth rates, εt is a temporal effect, and µit represents
the error term.
In identifying the impact of the growth in private and public health insurance
coverage on the growth in Medicaid expenditure, I explore random effects, fixed
effects, and two different dynamic panel estimators proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). These specifications eliminate any
unobservable time-invariant state effects and temporal effects that may systematically
affect Medicaid expenditure growth. I consider dynamic panel estimators because
growth rates of Medicaid expenditure in the current period are potentially related to
the growth rates of Medicaid expenditure in the previous periods. This is due to the
fact that individuals who have health conditions today are likely to have chronic
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effects from these conditions tomorrow requiring additional care and subsequent
expenditure. In their examination of total health care expenditure, Okunade and
Suraratdecha (2000) include the lag of the dependent variable as an explanatory
variable to account for inertia. They believe this inertia may result from time trends
and semi-durability of consumption of health spending. Further, Buchanan et al.
(1991) notes that traditional budgetary theory dictates that the level of Medicaid
spending in the prior year should affect the level of spending in the current year.
In the dynamic panel specifications, two additional terms, Medicaidexpit−1 and
Medicaidexpit−2 , are included in Equation (1). Inclusion of these lags of the
dependent variable causes endogeneity issues for the within estimator used by fixed
and random effects specifications, because these terms introduce correlations with
ηi, the state fixed effect. Dynamic panel estimators deal with these issues by using
the first difference to eliminate the state fixed effect. The Arellano-Bond estimator
instruments for the lag of the dependent variable in the first difference model with
other lagged levels of the dependent variable or other variables already specified within
the model to obtain consistent estimates. As a robustness check, I use the Arellano-
Bover estimator for the second dynamic panel specification. The Arellano-Bover
estimator is the same in all respects to the Arellano-Bond estimator except that it
allows lagged differences of the dependent variable to also be utilized as instruments
for the lagged levels of the dependent variable. I follow Potrafke (2010) in the choice
to use dynamic panel estimators in combination with growth rates.
Data sources are outlined in Table C.1 of Appendix C. PrivateHCE was
constructed for each state and year by subtracting reported expenditures on Medicaid
and expenditures on Medicare from total health care expenditure. All expenditure
variables by state and year were deflated using a regional consumer price index (CPI).
All real variables were calculated with 1995 as the base year. Following Matteo (2005),
states were divided into the following regions: New England, Mideast, Great Lakes,
Plains, Southeast, Southwest, Rocky Mountains, and Far West. A regional CPI was
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matched to each region. Table C.2 shows the state-region classifications for each CPI.
Annual growth rates were constructed for all variables.13
Figure C.1 shows the average annual growth rates across states for private health
insurance coverage, Medicaid coverage, and Medicaid expenditures from 1996-2004.
The growth in private health insurance coverage shows a steady increase until 1999,
and then declines until 2002. Over the entire time period, the largest average annual
growth in private health insurance coverage across states is around 1.8%.
In contrast, the average annual growth in Medicaid coverage shows an initial
decline but then increases until almost the end of the period. Average growth ranged
from a low of -8.1% in 1997 to a high of 7.5% in 2002. To address concerns regarding
external validity, these estimates are in line with projected annual growth in Medicaid
coverage expected from recent health care reform. Under a standard participation
scenario that assumes moderate levels of participation among those newly eligible for
coverage, Holahan and Headen (2010) project that Medicaid coverage across states is
likely to increase 27.4% from 2014 to 2019. This equates to an average growth rate
of 4.9% per year which falls in the range of annual Medicaid insurance growth during
this study. The growth in Medicaid expenditures across states is always positive over
the time period, and ranges from a low of 1.3% in 1998 to a high of 8.5% in 2002.
Panel summary statistics as well as those for specific years (1996, 2000, and 2004)
are included in Table C.3 of Appendix C.
4.4 Results
Table C.4 presents regression results for the the growth in expenditure on Medicaid.
Due to time trends and semi-durability of health consumption, the dynamic
specifications in columns (1) and (2), more accurately capture the underlying data
generating process by allowing for lags of the dependent variable to be considered
as explanatory variables within the model. In each specification, two lags of
13 In the case of missing data, linear interpolation is used for the education and smoking variables.
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the dependent variable were necessary in order to remove higher orders of serial
correlation. In these specifications, test statistics for second order autocorrelation
and higher fail to reject the null hypothesis meaning that there is no serial correlation
in the original error as desired. Further, in these specifications, the number
of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables meaning that these
models are over-identified. A test for over-identifying restrictions confirms that the
population moment conditions are correctly specified. 14
The Arellano-Bond specification in Column(1) is the main specification for the
discussion of results. The Arellano-Bover specification offers a robustness check to the
main specification. A fixed effects model is presented as a static model which serves as
a baseline for comparison of the dynamic panel estimators. In addition, the random
effects specification is included because a Hausman test of fixed verses random effects
fails to reject the null hypothesis in which the random effects estimator is consistent
and efficient. The coefficients and standard errors for all model specifications appear
in Columns (1)-(4).
In Column (1), the growth in private coverage does not have a statistically
significant impact on the growth of Medicaid spending. The Arellano-Bover
specification provides similar evidence regarding the statistical significance of this
impact. The growth in Medicaid coverage also does not have a statistically significant
impact on the growth of Medicaid expenditures in both dynamic specifications. In
the static models, this effect is statistically significant. The difference between the
dynamic and static specifications further highlights how failure to capture time trends
within health care spending potentially leads to incorrect inference. Other forms of
public and private health insurance growth do not have a statistically significant
14The number of instruments and p-values of the test for over-identification are reported in Table
C.4. It is important to note that these test statistics do not yield a value close to one. Roodman
(2006) cautions when the tests statistics yield a p-value close to one, this is a sign that the model
contains too many instruments. Including too many instruments within the specification can over-fit
the endogenous variables and, therefore, fail to eliminate their endogenous components. Reporting
the instrument count is important because another sign of an over-fit model is when the number of
instruments more than exceeds the number of cross section observations.
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impact on the growth of Medicaid expenditure in the main specification as well as
the robustness check in column (2).
In terms of the socio-economic factors within the main specification, only the
growth in private health care expenditure, share of the population over 65, and
share of the population 17 and below have a statistically significant impact on the
growth of Medicaid expenditure. Private health expenditure has a negative effect.
The estimated coefficient indicates that a 1 percentage point increase the growth of
private health expenditure decreases the growth of Medicaid expenditure by about
0.47 percentage points. The Arellano-Bover specification yields a similar result. To
put this estimate into perspective, average Medicaid expenditure across states grew
in nominal terms by 6.8% from 2003 to 2004. A back-of-the-envelope calculation
based on average nominal Medicaid expenditure during these years shows that this
impact translates into average annual savings of approximately 12.5 million dollars
for a state.
The growth in the share of the population 65 and over has a positive statistically
significant impact on the growth of Medicaid expenditure. For a 1 percentage point
increase in the growth of the portion of the population over 65, there is approximately
a 0.86 percentage point increase in the growth of Medicaid expenditure. The result
from column (2) also demonstrates evidence of this effect. Given this estimate and
the nominal Medicaid expenditure discussed previously, a second back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests that growth in this demographic contributes to an average annual
increase of approximately 18 million dollars in Medicaid expenditure for a state.
In contrast, the growth in the share of the population that is 17 and below has a
negative impact on Medicaid expenditure growth. A 1 percentage point increase in
the growth rate of the share of the population 17 and below decreases the growth of
Medicaid expenditure by approximately 0.48 percentage points. The other dynamic
specification provides additional support for the sign and statistical significance of
this result.
65
The growth in real state gross domestic product is not statistically significant
in the main specification; however, it is in the Arellano-Bover specification. The
estimated coefficient in Column (2) suggests that for a 1 percentage point increase in
state gross domestic product there is approximately a 0.48 percentage point increase
in the growth of Medicaid expenditure. The impacts of Unemployment, Smoke,
and Physicians are not statistically significant in the main specification, and the
robustness check from a second dynamic specification supports these results. With
respect to the impacts of the political environment and the growth of neighbors’
spending on the growth of Medicaid expenditure, none of these variables are
statistically significant, and estimated coefficients in column(2) provide additional
evidence of these results.
4.5 Discussion
The main contribution of this paper is to estimate the impact of growth in private
and public types of health insurance on the growth of Medicaid expenditure. The
results suggest that the growth in private health insurance coverage, Medicare, and
military coverage do not impact the growth in Medicaid expenditure. The null effect
of the growth in private health insurance coverage possibly stems from the fact that
growth in this type of coverage may not be large enough to increase demand for
care by enough to exert pressure on reimbursement rates through the pricing channel
discussed in Section 4.2. It is also possible that those who have private insurance come
from the healthiest segment of the population and require very few medical services
beyond preventative care thereby minimizing the influence of the price channel.
In the dynamic specifications, the growth in Medicaid insurance coverage does not
have a statistically significant impact on the growth of Medicaid expenditure. Only in
the static specifications that do not account for long run trends in health care spending
is the impact statistically significant. The dynamic specifications show that capturing
long run trends in health care spending is important for correct inference into the
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effects of the growth in Medicaid coverage. One possible reason that Medicaid growth
does not influence the growth in Medicaid expenditure in these specifications comes
from improvements in access to care. Since the growth in Medicaid insurance improves
access to care, this could allow individuals to become more informed regarding health
and wellness, which in turn improves health outcomes and reduces expenditures
on chronic conditions. Alternatively, inclusion of the long run trend in dynamic
specifications could reflect that states choose to control Medicaid expenditure growth
through a reduction in Medicaid benefits after experiencing budgetary pressures from
growth in these expenditures in previous periods. This reduction in Medicaid benefits
is equivalent to substitution at the intensive margin.
Focusing on the dynamic specifications, the factors that have a statistically
significant impact on the growth of Medicaid expenditure are the growth in state gross
domestic product, private health care expenditure, the share of the population 17 and
below, and the share of population 65 and over. The positive statistically significant
impact of state gross domestic product on Medicaid expenditure growth suggests
that states have a taste for redistribution in that as they generate more income they
spend more on their Medicaid programs. In studies of Medicaid expenditure inclusive
of federal dollars, Holahan and Cohen (1986) and Buchanan et al. (1991) find similar
results.
There are two impacts that have a statistically significant negative effect on the
growth of Medicaid expenditure. These results merit particular attention because
of their potential to bend states’ Medicaid expenditure curves. First, the impact of
the growth in private health care expenditure is negative. This relationship implies
that private health care expenditure serves as a substitute for public expenditure.
The back-of-the-envelope calculation in Section 4.4 demonstrates that a state could
save on average approximately 11 million dollars from the estimated effect. Second,
the growth in the share of the population 17 and below has a negative effect on the
growth of Medicaid expenditure. Growth in this share of the population may reduce
the growth in Medicaid expenditures because this portion of the population has the
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lowest percentage of chronic conditions requiring medical care. However, population
projections to 2030 for this age group suggest little growth in this demographic. 15
The most consequential impact for states is that of the growth in the share of
the population 65 and over. The growth in this portion of the population has
a statistically significant positive impact on the growth of Medicaid expenditure.
Health care trends for this age category show that life expectancy and chronic health
conditions are increasing. This increase in chronic health conditions leads to an
increase in the utilization of medical services. This increase in the demand for care
contributes to Medicaid expenditure growth, because even though this portion of
the population qualifies for Medicare insurance, some individuals rely on Medicaid
for supplemental insurance or long term care. In fact, given the estimated impact
from Section 4.4, this trend in growth may represent an even more pressing concern
for states regarding the sustainability of Medicaid expenditure than the growth in
health insurance coverage. A back-of-the-envelope calculation demonstrates that
a 1 percentage point increase in the growth of this demographic translates to 18
million dollars in additional Medicaid expenditure for an average state. Population
projections demonstrate that by 2030 the portion of the population 65 and over will
represent 16 percent of the total population.16 Given that currently 90.7% of this age
category experience chronic conditions, states may want to focus more on the potential
effects of an aging population and changes in Medicaid expenditure resulting from
their care rather than changes in health insurance coverage stemming from recent
health care reform.17
15U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Population Projections.
16U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Population Projections.
17Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, www.rwjf.org/files/research/50968chronic.care.chartbook.ppt,
(accessed on July 22, 2010).
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4.6 Conclusion
Since PPACA expands Medicaid eligibility, many state governors are concerned that
it will make state funded expenditure on Medicaid unsustainable. In light of these
concerns and recent research regarding health care expenditures, this study uses state-
level panel data from 1996-2004 capitalizing on within-state variation to identify
whether the growth in private and other public types of health insurance coverage,
namely Medicaid, impact the growth of Medicaid expenditure. The results suggest
that the growth of private health insurance coverage does not affect the growth in
Medicaid expenditure. Further, given that the projected growth in Medicaid coverage
from PPACA is in line with growth in Medicaid coverage during the time period of
this study, one important finding is that growth in Medicaid insurance coverage does
not influence the growth in Medicaid expenditures when time trends and the semi-
durability of health care consumption are accounted for. While the growth in health
insurance coverage does not appear to matter in terms of bending states’ Medicaid
expenditure curves, other factors such as private health care expenditure and age
distribution do. Specifically, the growth in private health care expenditures and the
share of the population 17 and under represent potential avenues for reducing the
growth in Medicaid expenditure, while the growth in the portion of the population 65
and over increases it. Given that the share of the population 65 and over is projected
to increase into 2030 and the fact 9 out 10 individuals in this age group has one or more
chronic health conditions, states may want to focus more on the potential effects of an
aging population within their state rather than changes in health insurance coverage
stemming from the reform. In an effort to bend Medicaid expenditure curves, the
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A.1 Efficiency of Health Care Delivery Systems:
Effects of Health Insurance Coverage
Figure A.1: A Health Care Delivery System
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Table A.1: Data Sources
Variable Source
hospital beds Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Hospital Cost Reports
physicians Bureau of Labor Statistics database
registered nurses Bureau of Labor Statistics database
population U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division
health status Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Annual Survey
disability Social Security Administration, Disabled Beneficiaries and Dependents Master Beneficiary record file
mortality rate Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vital Statistics of the United States; Mortality, 2001
poverty U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplements
employment Bureau of Economic Analysis, State Income and Employment Summary, March 2009
state gdp Bureau of Economic Analysis, State Income and Employment Summary, March 2009
high school diploma U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2010
population 65+ U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey 2000-2007
health insurance coverage U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplements
Table A.2: Summary Statistics - 2000
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Inputs
hospital beds* 48 2877.73 664.35 1802.37 4557.97
physicians* 48 488.82 215.13 173.30 1389.71
registered nurses* 48 8001.28 1426.66 5550.81 12018.70
Outputs
healthy share 48 0.853 0.032 0.746 0.903
able share 48 0.978 0.006 0.959 0.989
survival share 48 0.991 0.001 0.988 0.994
Env. Variables
poverty share 48 0.109 0.029 0.045 0.175
employment share 48 0.604 0.048 0.491 0.698
state gdp † 48 0.327 0.060 0.226 0.527
diploma share 48 0.853 0.040 0.771 0.918
share 65+ 48 0.127 0.017 0.085 0.175
total coverage 48 0.876 0.038 0.763 0.929
private coverage 48 0.742 0.062 0.571 0.847
public coverage 48 0.254 0.037 0.180 0.327
* Per million of residents.
† Per resident, measured in 100 thousand dollars.
Figure A.2: 2007 Estimated Efficiency Map
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics - 2004
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Inputs
hospital beds* 48 2778.33 648.79 1736.45 4491.93
physicians* 48 386.17 175.22 127.94 804.55
registered nurses* 48 8311.64 1448.88 5646.49 11659.96
Outputs
healthy share 48 0.846 0.034 0.765 0.900
able share 48 0.974 0.008 0.950 0.987
survival share 48 0.992 0.001 0.989 0.994
Env. Variables
poverty share 48 0.121 0.029 0.055 0.187
employment share 48 0.601 0.051 0.496 0.729
state gdp † 48 0.345 0.061 0.236 0.565
diploma share 48 0.864 0.037 0.783 0.923
share 65+ 48 0.127 0.015 0.086 0.169
total coverage 48 0.863 0.034 0.758 0.915
private coverage 48 0.705 0.058 0.594 0.823
public coverage 48 0.277 0.044 0.190 0.372
* Per million of residents.
† Per resident, measured in 100 thousand dollars.
Table A.4: Summary Statistics - 2007
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Inputs
hospital beds* 48 2672.84 588.09 1627.61 3939.81
physicians* 48 404.26 168.72 147.05 853.36
registered nurses* 48 8609.88 1549.19 5442.74 12152.99
Outputs
healthy share 48 0.844 0.032 0.769 0.891
able share 48 0.971 0.009 0.944 0.985
survival share 48 0.992 0.001 0.989 0.995
Env. Variables
poverty share 48 0.119 0.029 0.058 0.226
employment share 48 0.619 0.053 0.509 0.764
state gdp † 48 0.362 0.066 0.242 0.581
diploma share 48 0.858 0.036 0.785 0.912
share 65+ 48 0.129 0.015 0.089 0.171
total coverage 48 0.862 0.039 0.748 0.946
private coverage 48 0.695 0.062 0.558 0.799
public coverage 48 0.281 0.042 0.188 0.380
* Per million of residents.
† Per resident, measured in 100 thousand dollars.
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Figure A.3: Estimated Efficiency Histogram: 2000-2007
Figure A.4: Average Estimated Efficiency
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Table A.5: SW Bias Corrected Efficiency
State 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average
Alabama 0.677 0.591 0.752 0.637 0.668 0.649 0.599 0.647 0.652
Arizona 0.919 0.945 0.803 0.830 0.853 0.921 0.976 0.926 0.896
Arkansas 0.797 0.740 0.719 0.635 0.562 0.523 0.548 0.459 0.623
California 0.842 0.856 0.858 0.890 0.875 0.817 0.808 0.844 0.849
Colorado 0.916 0.876 0.980 1.000 0.928 0.798 0.777 0.848 0.890
Connecticut 0.622 0.632 0.634 0.653 0.978 0.718 0.696 0.669 0.700
Delaware 0.626 0.660 0.586 0.589 0.575 0.545 0.589 0.524 0.587
Florida 0.489 0.536 0.615 0.583 0.536 0.498 0.523 0.562 0.543
Georgia 0.706 0.573 0.606 0.589 0.871 0.749 0.844 0.660 0.700
Idaho 0.770 0.731 0.713 0.619 0.805 0.836 0.876 0.948 0.787
Illinois 0.528 0.478 0.536 0.549 0.572 0.552 0.595 0.575 0.548
Indiana 0.554 0.535 0.464 0.467 0.460 0.477 0.492 0.463 0.489
Iowa 0.693 0.609 0.573 0.555 0.574 0.591 0.491 0.537 0.578
Kansas 0.674 0.610 0.554 0.493 0.493 0.522 0.516 0.478 0.542
Kentucky 0.617 0.609 0.643 0.642 0.590 0.639 0.629 0.541 0.614
Louisiana 0.471 0.449 0.601 0.596 0.536 0.469 0.495 0.508 0.516
Maine 0.539 0.425 0.486 0.479 0.423 0.439 0.523 0.395 0.464
Maryland 0.507 0.522 0.524 0.511 0.537 0.530 0.522 0.508 0.520
Massachusetts 0.373 0.403 0.392 0.412 0.470 0.474 0.444 0.470 0.430
Michigan 0.599 0.579 0.627 0.614 0.624 0.586 0.580 0.533 0.593
Minnesota 1.000 0.549 0.495 0.540 0.659 0.562 0.625 0.732 0.645
Mississippi 0.481 0.449 0.428 0.350 0.320 0.334 0.395 0.401 0.395
Missouri 0.443 0.386 0.396 0.387 0.353 0.373 0.360 0.372 0.384
Montana 0.591 0.486 0.533 0.544 0.543 0.513 0.593 0.591 0.549
Nebraska 0.502 0.426 0.437 0.427 0.414 0.417 0.427 0.427 0.434
Nevada 0.903 0.836 0.723 0.659 0.689 0.754 0.771 0.787 0.765
New Hampshire 0.750 1.000 0.555 0.620 0.747 0.690 0.810 0.643 0.727
New Jersey 0.435 0.439 0.432 0.466 0.445 0.399 0.437 0.414 0.433
New Mexico 0.789 0.794 0.733 0.770 0.609 0.826 0.761 0.737 0.752
New York 0.457 0.506 0.546 0.643 0.609 0.554 0.578 0.615 0.564
North Carolina 0.601 0.525 0.540 0.533 0.567 0.513 0.526 0.537 0.543
North Dakota 0.543 0.567 0.504 0.453 0.470 0.522 0.479 0.406 0.493
Ohio 0.515 0.471 0.485 0.489 0.498 0.480 0.457 0.449 0.481
Oklahoma 0.689 0.779 0.702 0.630 0.573 0.569 0.552 0.491 0.623
Oregon 0.867 0.891 0.810 0.881 0.912 0.891 0.914 0.983 0.894
Pennsylvania 0.514 0.515 0.419 0.454 0.425 0.471 0.445 0.451 0.462
Rhode Island 0.553 0.444 0.454 0.493 0.467 0.540 0.469 0.426 0.481
South Carolina 0.706 0.722 0.632 0.602 0.561 0.547 0.516 0.519 0.601
South Dakota 0.412 0.392 0.391 0.476 0.449 0.420 0.429 0.406 0.422
Tennessee 0.398 0.420 0.400 0.424 0.402 0.402 0.697 0.654 0.475
Texas 0.817 0.775 0.732 0.743 0.671 0.627 0.622 0.635 0.703
Utah 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.983 0.999 0.975 1.000 1.000 0.995
Vermont 0.721 0.725 0.787 0.863 0.695 0.750 0.933 0.981 0.807
Virginia 0.700 0.680 0.649 0.653 0.652 0.672 0.670 0.606 0.660
Washington 0.892 0.920 0.751 0.756 0.847 0.783 0.812 0.857 0.827
West Virginia 0.478 0.449 0.456 0.428 0.410 0.415 0.440 0.381 0.432
Wisconsin 0.619 0.618 0.591 0.591 0.685 0.639 0.637 0.633 0.626
Wyoming 0.596 0.619 0.597 0.598 0.633 0.564 0.555 0.547 0.589
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Table A.6: Simar and Wilson (2007) Bootstrapping Estimation Results
Specification 1∗ Specification 2∗
constant 1.884 1.655
[1.182 , 2.546] [1.036 , 2.264]
poverty share -1.123 -1.607
[-1.885 , -0.294] [-2.514 , -0.618]
diploma share 1.054 1.136
[0.440 , 1.658] [0.530 , 1.740]
employment share -0.383 -0.318
[-0.784 , 0.009] [-0.721 , 0.072]
state gdp -0.163 -0.229
[-0.426 , 0.106] [-0.489 , 0.040]
share 65+ -5.136 -5.247








* SW (2007) 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
90
91
Table A.7: Traditional Second Stage Regressions
Variable OLS Tobit Truncated
constant 2.332* 2.042* 2.320* 2.034* 2.511* 2.167*
[1.919 , 2.744] [1.680 , 2.403] [1.897 , 2.743] [1.664 , 2.404] [2.083 , 2.939] [1.804 , 2.530]
poverty share -1.281* -2.322* -1.313* -2.345* -1.354* -2.387*
[-1.771 , -0.790] [-2.884 , -1.759] [-1.816 , -0.810] [-2.921 , -1.767] [-1.848 , -0.858] [-2.947 , -1.827]
employment share -0.653* -0.634* -0.704* -0.681* -0.639* -0.629*
[-0.898 , -0.407] [-0.869 , -0.397] [-0.957 , -0.451] [-0.923 , -0.437] [-0.889 , -0.388] [-0.865 , -0.393]
state gdp -0.030 -0.085 -0.072 -0.126 -0.041 -0.096
[-0.192 , 0.132] [-0.242 , 0.0718] [-0.239 , 0.096] [-0.288 , 0.036] [-0.205 , 0.123] [-0.253 , 0.060]
diploma share 0.981* 1.201* 1.117* 1.331* 0.840* 1.088*
[0.606 , 1.355] [0.839 , 1.561] [0.727 , 1.506] [0.955 , 1.705] [0.446 , 1.232] [0.717 , 1.460]
share 65+ -4.352* -4.976* -4.711* -5.284* -4.574* -5.095*
[-4.964 , -3.738] [-5.669 , -4.283] [-5.364 , -4.056] [-6.009 , -4.557] [-5.272 , -3.874] [-5.833 , -4.357]
total coverage -1.524* -1.532* -1.555*
[-1.839 , -1.207] [-1.856 , -1.206] [-1.883 , -1.226]
private coverage -1.406* -1.420* -1.418*
[-1.664 , -1.147] [-1.685 , -1.154] [-1.680 , -1.157]
public coverage -0.020 -0.046 -0.0145
[-0.361 , 0.322] [-0.396 , 0.304] [-0.359 , 0.329]
sigma .0854 .0816 .0875 .0834 .0828 .0781
Notes. Table shows regressions of traditional DEA efficiency on environmental variables.
* Denotes significance at a 1% level. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
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Figure B.1: Cost Minimization
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Table B.1: Summary Statistics
Entire Panel MA MA Other States Other States
2000-2009 Pre-Policy Post-Policy Pre-Policy Post-Policy
Dependent Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Utilization Measures
Total Discharges 8227 9844 7322 9601 7851 10297 8165 9512 8678 10596
ADC 136 144 128 140 132 147 136 147 137 155
ALS 33 205 37 122 31 81 32 198 32 248
Ambulance Trips 2010 2192 2154 1101 1620 634 2041 2265 1932 2174
Major Inputs
Beds 187 174 173 164 179 172 188 171 187 181
Employees 1103 1654 1116 1640 1298 2003 1060 1600 1162 1487
Figure B.2: Mean Total Discharges
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Figure B.3: Mean Average Daily Census
Figure B.4: Mean Average Length of Stay
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Figure B.5: Mean Ambulance Trips
Figure B.6: Mean Number of Beds
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Figure B.7: Mean Number of Employees
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Figure B.8: Distribution of Demand for Care
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Figure B.9: Distribution of Demand for Emergency Care
Figure B.10: Total Discharges Trend
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Figure B.11: Average Daily Census Trend
Figure B.12: Average Length of Stay Trend
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Figure B.13: Mean Ambulance Trips
Figure B.14: Beds Trend
102
Figure B.15: Employees Trend
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Table B.2: Main Specification Results-Effects of Policy in Post-Mandate Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable A. Trips Discharges ADC ALS Beds Employees
MA*After -325.88* 14.17 3.55 -9.91** 7.36** 91.74
(196.50) (137.75) (2.73) (4.53) (3.76) (100.63)
N 1932 10236 10241 10236 10249 10240
Note 1: Block bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. * (10%) ** (5%) ***(1%) significance.
Note 2: Hospital, state, year fixed effects and time varying state controls included.
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Table B.3: Alternative Specification Results-Effects of Policy in Different Post-Mandate Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable A. Trips Discharges ADC ALS Beds Employees
MA*Year07 -441.12* -86.64 2.86 -4.57* 6.18* 87.78
(234.16) (134.45) (2.78) (2.79) (3.27) (135.34)
MA*Year08 -353.23 26.77 3.84 -10.84** 7.60 ** 84.95
(223.35) (138.86) (3.06) (5.17) (3.74) (149.96)
MA*Year09 -163.34 136.39 4.16 -16.03** 8.71 105.35
(248.14) (161.08) (3.97) (7.60) (5.48) (149.97)
N 1932 10236 10241 10236 10249 10240
Note 1: Block bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. * (10%) ** (5%) ***(1%) significance.
Note 2: Hospital, state, year fixed effects and time varying state controls included included.
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Table B.4: Robustness Check 1-Anticipatory Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable A. Trips Discharges ADC ALS Beds Employees
MA*After -239.38* -117.28 0.34 -3.19* 5.38** 58.08
(135.46) (98.87) (1.44) (1.75) (2.49) (40.11)
Wald Statistic Selects Yes NA NA No Yes NA
N 6963 10236 10241 10236 10249 10240
Note 1: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. * (10%) ** (5%) ***(1%) significance.
Note 2: Hospital, state, and year fixed effects included.
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Table B.5: Robustness Check 2-Effects of Policy in Post-Mandate Period-Log Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable (in logs) A. Trips Discharges ADC ALS Beds Employees
MA*After -.175 -0.003 -0.025 -0.020* 0.029* 0.020
(.118) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) (0.16) (0.023)
N 6963 10236 10241 10236 10249 10240
Note 1: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. * (10%) ** (5%) ***(1%) significance.
Note 2: Hospital, state, and year fixed effects included.
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Does Health Insurance Matter?
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Table C.1: Data Sources
Variable Description Source
Dependent Variables
Medicaidexp State funded Medicaid expenditure Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Independent Variables
Private HI Private HI Coverage U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey
Medicaid HI Medicaid HI Coverage U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey
Medicare HI Medicare HI Coverage U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey
Military HI Military HI Coverage U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey
SGDP State gross domestic product Bureau of Economic Analysis, State Income and Employment Summary
Unemployment Unemployment Rate Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics
Smoke Share of population that smokes CDC, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Annual Survey
Bachelor Degree Share of population with at least a bachelor’s degree U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States,
Share 65 Share of population 65 and over U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey
Share17 Share of population 17 and below U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey
Physicians Number of Physicians per capita Bureau of Labor Statistics
Lower House Democratic majority in Lower House of state legislature U.S. Statistical Abstract of the United States
Upper House Democratic majority in Upper House of state legislature U.S. Statistical Abstract of the United States
Other Measures
FMAP Federal Medical Assistance Percentage U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Total Population Total Population in thousands U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey
Total HCE Total health care expenditure Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Medicare HCE Medicare health care expenditure Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Regional CPI Regional Consumer Price Index Bureau of Labor Statistics
* Numeric variables are constructed as growth rates.
** Measures used in the construction of certain variables are described in Chapter 4.
Table C.2: Regional CPI
New England Mideast Great Lakes Plains
CPI Boston CPI New York, NJ CPI Chicago CPI Midwest Urban
CT DE IL IA
ME MD IN KS
MA NJ MI MN
NH NY OH MO
RI PA WI NE
VT ND
SD
Southeast Southwest Rocky Mountain Far West
CPI Atlanta CPI Dallas Fortworth CPI Midwest Urban CPI San Francisco
AL AZ CO AK
AR NM ID CA
FL OK MT HI










Table C.3: Summary Statistics
1996-2004 1996 2000 2004
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent
Medicaid Exp 0 .0469 0.0608 0.0418 0.0879 0.0322 0.0439 0.0555 0.0524
Independent
Private HI -0.0035 0.0308 -0.0009 0.0348 -0.0015 0.0271 -0.0019 0.0303
Medicaid HI 0.0251 0.1633 0.0041 0.1730 0.0587 0.1740 0.0429 0.1424
Medicare HI 0.0091 0.0840 0.0237 0.0932 0.0281 0.0994 -0.0007 0.0681
Military HI 0.0438 0.2859 -0.0404 0.2219 0.0681 0.2504 0.0766 0.2714
SGDP 0.0166 0.0335 0.0303 0.0512 -0.0083 0.0227 0.0353 0.0228
Unemployment 0.0098 0.1347 -0.0190 0.0650 -0.0463 0.0830 -0.0732 0.0572
Smoke -0.0049 0.0665 0.0482 0.0724 -0.0088 0.0574 -0.0472 0.0582
Bachelor Degree 0.0209 0.1099 0.0052 0.1555 0.0118 0.0769 0.0252 0.2323
Share65+ -0.0016 0.0107 0.0023 0.0136 -0.0111 0.0189 0.0026 0.0058
Share17- -0.0077 0.0209 -0.0126 0.0303 -0.0031 0.0196 -0.0151 0.0142
Private HCE 0.0443 0.0281 0.0214 0.0252 0.0322 0.0266 0.0397 0.0251
Physicians 0.0062 0.0339 0.0193 0.0561 -0.0312 0.0166 -0.0111 0.0137
LowerHouse 0.5000 0.5006 0.5208 0.5049 0.4791 0.5049 0.4583 0.5035
UpperHouse 0.4514 0.4982 0.4791 0.5049 0.4375 0.5013 0.4792 0.5049
IComp 0.0476 0.0371 0.0560 0.0240 0.0570 0.0194 0.0410 0.0281
*These summary statistics represent growth rates of the variables.
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Figure C.1: Average Annual Growth of Health Insurance and Medicaid Expenditure
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Table C.4: State Funded Medicaid Expenditure Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Specification Robustness Check Static Specification Static Specification
Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bover Random Effects Fixed Effects
PrivateHI 0.0220 0.0172 0.0560 0.0485
(0.1135) (0.1408) (0.0834) (0.0828)
MedicaidHI 0.0161 0.0240 0.0344∗∗ 0.0313∗
(0.0189) (0.0229) (0.0153) (0.0160)
MedicareHI -0.0344 -0.0271 0.000796 0.00834
(0.0355) (0.0346) (0.0272) (0.0283)
MilitaryHI -0.00290 -0.00207 0.00292 0.00480
(0.0128) (0.0104) (0.0089) (0.0095)
SGDP 0.306 0.484∗∗ 0.278∗∗ 0.245∗∗
(0.2271) (0.1987) (0.1098) (0.1066)
Unemployment 0.0150 0.0184 0.0175 0.0104
(0.0398) (0.0491) (0.0304) (0.0295)
Smoke 0.0359 0.0528 0.0734∗ 0.0716∗
(0.0521) (0.0545) (0.0416) (0.0423)
BachelorDegree 0.00780 -0.0186 0.0355 0.0336
(0.0358) (0.0407) (0.0242) (0.0251)
Share65 0.856∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗
(0.2642) (0.3230) (0.2173) (0.2717)
Share17 -0.481∗∗ -0.339∗ -0.297∗∗ -0.243
(0.2103) (0.1731) (0.1474) (0.1666)
PrivateHCE -0.471∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.494∗∗∗ -0.606∗∗∗
(0.1054) (0.1284) (0.1104) (0.1147)
Physicians 0.277 0.258 0.281∗ 0.425∗∗
(0.1834) (0.1642) (0.1463) (0.1608)
LowerHouse 0.00594 -0.00950 -0.00856∗ -0.00374
(0.0193) (0.0176) (0.0044) (0.0104)
UpperHouse 0.0101 0.0226 0.00740 0.0124
(0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0049) (0.0149)
IComp 0.00756 -0.0332 -0.00185 -0.0384
(0.0854) (0.0972) (0.0823) (0.0816)
cons 0.0632∗∗∗ 0.0603∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.0694∗∗∗
(0.0239) (0.0159) (0.0121) (0.0136)
N 432 432 432 432
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Temporal Effects Y Y Y Y
Lags of Dep. Variable 2 2 0 0
Number of Instruments 51 52 0 0
P-values from test of over-identification 0.56 0.29 NA NA
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
NA = Not applicable.
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